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I. BACKGROUND: 
Introduction 
The decision-making processes of the legislature and 
judiciary are more easily understood, and usually more visible to the 
public, than those of the scores of regulatory agencies whose 
critical decisions impact our daily lives. The Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC), for example, has a tremendous workload and agenda 
which annually involves thousands of decisions impacting not only 
transportation and water utilities, but the critical concerns 
involving the cost and quality of telephone, gas and electric service 
to all Californians. With the large number of significant 
proceedings handled by this commission, and the recent commission 
decisions made to abandon traditional ways of regulating utilities 
and instead promote "deregulation," the manner in which the PUC 
conducts business has become a controversial issue. 
How PUC decisions are made, and the fairness of the process, 
has been an ongoing issue at the PUC for many years. Depending upon 
the make-up of the commission and the decisions made, various 
interests have either thought the process has worked well--or has 
been in need of overhaul procedural guidel 
Recent Senate actions to address some of these concerns 
included bills Senator Rosenthal to require ex parte disclosure 
rules, and to better separate the roles of Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJ 1 s) and the PUC commissioners. Last session, Senator Roberti 
undertook a comprehensive process of investigating complaints about 
the PUC process using Preprint SB 8 as a vehicle for discussion. 
Based on the Preprint SB 8 review, this year Senator Roberti 
introduced SB 1042 to respond to concerns about internal PUC 
procedures, and SB 1041 to reform the process for judicial review of 
PUC decisions. 
Inside the commission, debate has continued concerning 
procedural reforms. For example, several attempts have been made 
the past to establish general ex parte rules, only to fail. Last 
month the PUC once again issued "proposed" rules which would 
regulate the review of ex parte communications--this proposal rel 
on a system of public disclosure. 
Make-up of PUC 
Originally established in 1911 as Railroad Commission, 
the PUC authori by the state constitution to regulate 
utilities. The Governor appoints the Senate approves the five 
commissioners who serve staggered six-year terms. 
Commissioners approve all regulatory dec ions by a major 
vote, usually after a lengthy process which involves both 
quasi-legislat /judicial responsibilities. The PUC code requires 
the commission to determine how utility service can best be delivered 
in a safe and reliable manner and what amount is appropriate for 
ratepayers to pay for the service. The commissioners must also 
determine a fair rate of return for the utilities and their 
stockholders. 
In the past, the most important proceedings at the PUC have been 
traditional rate cases--when utilities request a change in the rates 
they charge or the services they provide. But most of this has 
changed since this commission dramatically altered utility regulation 
to favor market based decisions. Recently, the PUC has initiated 
own investigatory proceedings as an intial step to significant 
restructuring of the lity industry. 
PUC Process 
The process of determining the outcome of investigations or 
changes requested by utilities results in the "hearing process", 
which generally includes the following steps: 
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o a prehearing conference may be held to identify the 
parties involved and the major issues which need to be addressed; 
o an assigned Commissioner, as well as an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ), are selected to preside over the actual hearing where 
the parties, their lawyers, economists and other expert witnesses 
present testimony. Testimony is either given in support of the 
utility's request or against it. Written legal briefs are also 
presented and reviewed by the ALJ; 
o the ALJ, upon completion of the hearing, issues a draft 
decision which is usually reviewed and approved by the assigned 
commissioner which is circulated for comments among the parties; 
o after review of the comments, the commissioner assigned to 
the specific case, issues a decision which is presented to the full 
commission for approval. 
o the commissioners vote on the decision; dissatisfied 
parties can petition for a modification of the decision; 
o the last avenue for critics of the commission's final 
decision is to request that the state Supreme Court (the only 
appellate court allowed to review PUC decisions) reverse the PUC 
action. The Supreme Court rarely agrees to such review requests. 
II. CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT PUC PROCESS 
Increasingly, concerns have been raised at legislative hearings 
and in other forums about maintaining a fair PUC process. It is 
obviously very difficult for a party to various PUC proceedings to 
criticize the commission which regulates it. However, as the speed 
and scope of several recent PUC proceedings have pitted various 
distinct competitive groups against each other, and as this 
commission has moved in regulatory directions that some contend favor 
the general deregulatory goals of large utility interests, criticisms 
about the process have surfaced. Among the concerns raised about PUC 
process are: 
Appellate court Review -- Some have complained that because the 
decisions made by the PUC can only be reviewed by the California 
Supreme Court, which rarely accepts review of PUC cases, there is 
in actuality no effective judicial accountability of PUC decisions. 
Few statutory changes have been made since the Supreme Court was 
first established as the sole reviewer of commission decisions. 
When the Supreme Court does grant a petition for review of a PUC 
decision, it will receive a record, hear arguments and render an 
opinion with an explanation of its reasoning. However, judicial 
review of PUC decisions is an exceptional event, as noted in a 1988 
article published in the Hasting Law Journal: 
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In some ninety percent of the cases 
coming up from the CPUC, however, the 
court denies the petition for a writ 
of review. In such cases, the court 
does not have the record before it, 
does not hear oral argument, and 
issues its denial without opinion or 
explanation. 
Even in cases where the Supreme Court has agreed to review a PUC 
decision, some have argued that the statutory standard of judicial 
review is so narrow, that fair and just decisions are not always 
forthcoming. 
A variety of divergent parties have promoted the establishment of 
an additional lower appellate court review, where PUC decisions are 
more likely to be considered. These parties believe that the greater 
likelihood of lower court review will provide an incentive for the 
PUC to adhere to fairer procedures and make careful decisions clearly 
based on the case record in the case and applicable law. 
In addition to the above recommendation from parties who practice 
before the PUC, the Select Committee on Internal Procedures of the 
Supreme Court has recommended that legislation be introduced to 
eliminate the Supreme Court's original review jurisdiction over PUC 
decisions in order to relieve the Supreme Court of burdensome 
case load. 
In response to this report, in 1989 Assemblyman Floyd introduced 
AB 338 to permit the Supreme Court to transfer the judicial review of 
PUC decisions to a court of appeal. The PUC and major utilities 
opposed the bill, and it was defeated. 
Ex Parte Communication -- The PUC does not have administrative 
regulations to monitor ex parte (private, off-the-record) 
communications or to trigger a prohibition of such communications in 
certain controversial, contested cases. In recent years, the staff 
has prepared recommendations for dealing with such sensitive 
discussions--but the commission has decided not to adopt 
administrative procedures for a comprehensive ex parte rule. 
Instead, the PUC has testified that because of its quasi-legislative; 
judicial roles, it prefers to make ex parte rules on a case-by-case 
basis "in particular cases of great importance and widespread public 
interest." Presently, the commissioners, ALJ's and staff not only 
meet privately with parties to significant hearings, but also have no 
restrictions on discussions involving complaint cases--which are 
adjudicatory in nature. 
Critics contend that the present laissez faire system with 
respect to communications between parties and PUC policy makers is 
not in the public interest--because so many important regulatory 
decisions can be made behind closed doors without regard to the 
public record. They also point out that the PUC has only recently 
moved to initiate ex parte restrictions when the Attorney General 
raised the concern as a party to controversial cases. Other parties 
have defended the system stating that access to commissioners is an 
important part of doing business at the PUC. 
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Several other federal and state agencies presently have 
either administrative or statutorily-mandated procedures for 
conducting ex parte discussions. For example, the Air Resources 
Board and the California Energy Commission have administrative 
ex parte rules in place. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has strict rules for dealing with telecommunication companies, 
including a disclosure rule for less significant proceedings. 
The California legislature also recently approved, and 
Governor Deukmejian signed into law, the establishment of a 
"California Integrated Waste Management and Recycling Board" with 
strict ex parte communication restrictions. On the other hand, the 
Senate defeated legislation by Assemblyman Friedman to established an 
ex parte disclosure rule for the California Coastal Commission. 
Administrative Law Judge Reform -- There are two major schools of 
thought with respect to what the role of the ALJ's should be in the 
PUC. Some argue that they should be independent and make decisions 
based on the record, which the commissioners can either agree with, 
change or disagree with in their final decision. Certain parties and 
several ALJ's have stated that the ALJ draft decision should be a 
separate document from the commissioner's final decision, and that an 
effort should be made to more clearly define the separate roles of 
the ALJ's and the commissioners. For example, critics of the current 
system state that because an ALJ's decision presently has to be 
approved by the assigned commissioner before it can be released, 
great pressure is put upon the judge by the assigned commissioner 
to make the proposed decision reflect the commissioner's view, thus 
undermining the independence of the ALJ. 
The other school of thought argues that historically the 
ALJ's are there to assist the assigned commissioners. Some 
commission members believe that besides the ALJ's statutory 
responsibilities to hear cases, the primary function of the ALJ's 
should be to assist the assigned commissioner or commission on 
specific cases. Rather than being an independent and public draft 
recommendation, they believe the ALJ decision, which reflects the 
assigned commissioner's views, should be more a preview of what the 
commission will likely decide. 
Section 311 of the Public Utilities Code specifies what the 
roles of the ALJ's are. The two most important parts of the code are 
the following: 
(1) "(b) ... The commission, upon scheduling hearings and specifying 
the scope of issues to be heard in any proceeding ... shall assign an 
administrative law judge to preside over the hearings, either sitting 
alone or assisting the commissioner or commissioners who will hear 
the case." and, 
(2) "(d) The administrative law judge shall prepare and file an 
opinion setting forth recommendations, findings and conclusions. The 
opinion of the (ALJ) is the proposed decision and a part of the 
public record in the proceeding. The decision of the (ALJ) shall be 
filed with the commission and served upon all parties to the action 
or proceeding ... (t)he commission shall issue its decision not sooner 
than 30 days following filing and service of the proposed decision by 
the (ALJ) ." 
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Thus either concerning the role ALJ's--one of independence or 
one of assisting the assigned commissioner--can be supported by 
existing law. 
Discovery Rules -- Some parties have been concerned that the PUC 
does not have rules for "discovery" of information held by parties to 
a case or hearing. They contend that some parties, especially the 
smaller ones, are left at a disadvantage when it comes to confronting 
other parties in PUC proceedings. The PUC has testified that it does 
not believe it necessary to establish formal discovery rules. 
AB 2252 (Friedman) of 1989, was introduced to require the PUC to 
adopt such a rule, but failed passage. 
Com laint Procedures -- Some parties have raised concerns about 
the 1cu ty 1n con ucting complaint proceedings at the PUC and 
have questioned if the new market based regulatory programs adopted 
by the commission will make the complaint process even more 
difficult to undertake. For example, with new telecommunication 
issues involving lucrative competitive services increasingly becoming 
the topic for complaints at the PUC, the timing and length of the 
complaint process will determine how successful competitors can be in 
their efforts to compete with large utilities. 
Workshops -- Informal "workshops" as a PUC procedure have 
increased in the past few years. They are primarily used to 
reconcile or work out the various details (often significant) of 
major regulatory reform cases initiatied by the PUC. Some critics 
have complained that there have been no standard rules for these 
workshops, no recorded proceedings, and that their ad hoc nature has 
assisted the large utilities at the expense of the smaller 
competitive parties. 
III. Legislative Efforts to Improve PUC Administrative and Judicial 
Review Procedures 
The "Bagley-Keene Act" (Sect. 11125 of the Government Code) 
requires that the public be notified of meetings of state agencies 
and be supplied with an agenda to be covered at the meeting. Also, 
present law requires that copies of public documents to be discussed 
be made available and that reports of executive sessions be made 
public. 
AB 3991 (Moore) enacted in 1984, requires the PUC to compile and 
report to the legislature on its rules of procedure on an annual 
basis. 
AB 4237 (Hauser-1988) and AB 338 (Floyd-1989) would have 
authorized a court of appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, to 
review PUC decisions. These bills were defeated. 
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In 1989 the Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee held an 
interim hearing on two bills introduced by Chairman Rosenthal: 
SB 1125 (Rosenthal) would have established the "Public Utilities 
Commission Ex Parte Disclosure Act" by requiring the PUC to adopt 
rules governing ex parte communications. Based on FCC rules of 
disclosure, which most telecommunication corporations must follow at 
the federal level, SB 1125 made a legislative finding that the flow 
of information in PUC proceedings was important and "should only be 
curtailed where absolutely necessary, but that disclosure of those 
contacts should be public information and made part of the record." 
SB 1125 did not prohibit ex parte communication--but rather required 
the PUC to issue public notices of these contacts. 
SB 1126 (Rosenthal) initially would have required that a separate 
"Division of Public Utilities Commission Administrative Law Judges" 
be created in the Office of Administrative Hearings of the Department 
of General Services. The bill was later amended to only prohibit the 
approval by a commissioner of an ALJ proposed decision before it was 
made public, in order to enhance the independence of ALJ decisions. 
Both these bills died in policy committee due, in part, to intense 
opposition lobbying by the PUC and major utilities. 
IV. Roberti Preprint SB 8 process/New Legislation 
In April 1990, in response to a variety of parties who 
believed that the PUC process was unfair, Senator Roberti introduced 
Preprint SB 8 which involved both reforming the complaint process at 
the PUC and modifying the judicial review process. The preprint was 
used by the Senator's staff as a vehicle for discussion on a variety 
of problems involving the PUC process--including many issues 
mentioned above. 
Staff conducted several meetings with parties involved in the 
PUC process, and undertook individual meetings with any utility or 
party which specifically asked to share their viewpoints on 
Preprint 8. The following two bills are the results of those 
discussions and meetings and generally address the most significant 
topics which the author believes will improve the PUC by implementing 
basic procedural changes: 
SB 1041 (Roberti) 
Existing law provides that judicial review of PUC decisions 
resides exclusively with the California Supreme Court. SB 1041 would 
provide that judicial review of PUC decisions could be considered in 
the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District, and then, if 
necessary, by the Supreme Court. 
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SB 1042 (Roberti) 
SB 1042 would revise PUC procedures by requiring the 
commission to establish ex parte communication rules involving 
communications with members of the Commission and ALJ's. 
This bill would also require the findings and decision of an 
ALJ to be based on the record of the proceeding, and would further 
require the commission to be bound by the factual findings of the 
ALJ, and to explain, with reference to the record, any substantive 
changes made by the commission that deviate from the proposed ALJ 
decision. 
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SENATOR HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL, CHAIRMAN: We're going to wait about five minutes, and 
then we'll start. I want to thank Senator Lockyer in absentia for his cooperation in 
putting together this joint committee informational hearing today between the Energy 
and Public Utilities and the Judiciary Committees. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee thought that they might be finished by now, but it 
appears that they're going a little bit longer. And we agreed that we would begin this 
informational hearing, and Senator Lockyer and Senator Roberti will be joining us, 
along with other Judiciary members and other members of our committee. The reason that 
both of the Chairmen agreed to such a hearing at this time was because Senator Roberti 
introduced two bills -- SB 1041 and SB 1042 -- which would do some significant things 
to the way the State's Public Utilities Commission conducts its business. 
The bills would make three simple changes to the PUC: First, create a new level of 
judicial review for PUC decisions; second, create a consistent ~ parte procedure; and 
third, make PUC administrative law judges more independent from decisions made by the 
PUC Commissioners. 
This hearing is needed because although these changes may seem simple, their impact 
into the complicated world of the PUC will be significant. Therefore it is important 
for these two committees to understand these bills and what they will do before votes 
are taken. 
As Chairman of this committee for the past eight years I'm all too aware of some of 
the concerns that may be expressed here today. The theme, I believe, will be 
fairness -- fairness of the PUC process -- in this active time of utility deregulation 
and redefinition. I can attest to the significant changes which have occurred to 
telecommunications and energy utilities over the past five to six years, with most 
regulatory changes occurring to enhance competition. I've not agreed with all of these 
changes, but I've understood the nature of appointed commissioners and their agendas. 
However, it's when I continue to hear criticism of the process undertaken to 
achieve regulatory decisions that I get upset. And ironically, it seems to be the 
competitive groups which we've heard th~ most -- raise the most concerns. So while 
we're supposed to be doing deregulation in order to create competition, the problems 
that we've heard have come from the competition. 
Some members may be familiar with other attempts to change the PUC process. Last 
session I offered legislation to deal with a few of the topics that the Roberti bills 
also address. Senator Roberti's staff has worked for over a year to review the 
concerns raised by various parties which must participate with the PUC. The Preprint 8 
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process, as it was known, brought all interested parties, utilities, consumer and 
ratepayer groups to the Capitol to discuss the fairness of the PUC process and how to 
improve it. I want to commend Senator Roberti and his staff for the hard work they've 
done to bring an important issue to the Legislature. 
With the time constraints today we have selected witnesses to give a broad overview 
of the issues involved, and I'm hopeful that they'll speak-- only speak generally 
about the bills. I don't want necessarily to get into the finite details, because 
those can be worked out if in fact there is some sort of agreement in the direction the 
bills should go. But now is the time to speak about the process at the PUC and the 
problems or lack of them that some may have encountered. 
Now, how the concepts of the Legislature would impact it --there'll be other times 
to talk about more specific aspects of the bills. We've asked all interested parties 
not testifying today to use the open microphone at the end of the hearing to make one 
short statement if they wish, or to submit written testimony for a transcript which 
will be made available. And we are transcribing this hearing. 
we have three short panels today, and I want to keep the testimony to approximately 
five minutes each if we can, and I hope that you'll please identify yourselves. And 
let me call the first panel: Audrie Krause; Joel Anderson; Phillip DiVirgilio; Dennis 
Mangers; Thomas MacBride; and John McDonald. 
Okay, I'm just informed that Mr. MacBride has a time constraint in terms of 
catching a plane or something, and so I'll ask him to lead off. Now, identify your 
name and who you represent so that for the record we'll have it there. 
MR. THOMAS J. MACBRIDE, JR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. 
My name is Thomas MacBride, and I'm testifying today on behalf of a number of entities 
that regularly participate in PUC proceeding. For the record, those groups are the 
California Association of Long Distance Telephone Companies, known as CALTEL which is 
an association of about 25 long distance companies here in California; the Telephone 
Answering Services of California, a statewide association of answering services and 
voice mail and voice messaging providers; and US Sprint. I believe that at least, also 
two of the members of CALTEL -- MCI Communications and Bay Area Teleport have 
already indicated their support for Senate Bills 1041 and 1042 to the committee. The 
hour is late and the witnesses are many, so I'll be brief. 
First, the groups that I represent want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the 
Senate leadership for addressing the Commission's processes as a priority item this 
session. But I think that it would be shortsighted to simply regard this endeavor that 
the Senate is undertaking as a criticism of the agency. I view it rather as a 
recognition by the Senate that the California Public Utilities Commission is the single 
most powerful state regulatory body in the United States. It's decisions have a daily 
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impact on consumers and business enterprises throughout the state. 
Now while it's a body created by the Constitution, it derives virtually all of its 
authority from the Legislature. And the Constitution expressly provides that the 
Legislature will determine the fashion in which PUC decision are reviewed by the 
courts. And it's the view of those who are supporting these bills that judicial review 
is absolutely essential to the operation of an agency with that level of influence. 
It's got to be more than just cursory judicial review, which is the case today. 
A number of proposals are before the committee today, and some are in the proposed 
legislation. You'll probably hear some others from the witnesses. It's my view, 
however, that the single most important provision before the committee today is the 
judicial review provisions provided for in Senate Bill 1041, which would establish 
judicial review as a matter of right in the Court of Appeal. Meaningful judicial 
review will promote PUC decisions predicated on the record of the proceeding and in 
conformance with procedural and substantive provisions of existing law. In the absence 
of meaningful judicial review, enactment of the other proposals may well prove to be an 
exercise in futility. The judicial review provisions, in my view, contained in SB 1041 
are the predicate to other procedural reforms. 
Now, I'd like to put one myth to rest. It is simply not the case that judicial 
review as provided for in Senate Bill 1041 would result in a flood of litigation, tying 
up the Commission's proceedings indefinitely. Last year in response when there were 
some proposals before the Senate last year, I performed a study of the Commission 
agendas for the 1989 fiscal year 1989-90 fiscal year -- which confirmed what most of 
us already know. The vast majority of Commission decisions are on contested matters 
that could not result in an appeal. Of the about 1,100 decisions that the Commission 
issued during that period, about a fifth could have been regarded as remotely 
contested. 
And if even half of the non-prevailing parties in those matters were willing to 
bear the significant legal expenses and other expenses of proceeding through an 
application for rehearing process and then go to a -- take an appeal to the civil 
courts, the number of appellate decisions resulting would be less than the decisional 
caseload of a single appellate justice. And if one of these parties seeks a stay of 
the underlying Commissioner orders, the party will bear the heavy burden provided for 
under existing law of demonstrating some type of irreparable harm, and will probably be 
required to post some sort of bond or could under the rules that would be retained even 
if SB 1041 is enacted. 
The crucial thing is that today neither the Commission nor those that are affected 
by its decisions receive any guidance from the court regarding the state of law 
governing the Commission's most important activities. There've been decisions on 
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attorneys' fees; there•ve been decisions on attorney-client privilege and whether the 
Commission can take -- make rulings on property matters, but nothing -- we haven't had 
anything in the last few years on are they -- on what they're doing in 
telecommunications, energy, and transportation. 
Now, a number of us, for example -- a number of us think that the Commission's 
phased deregulation of AT&T violates the statute that happens to exist that requires 
hearings when the Commission wants to modify its past decisions. We've raised the 
issue with the Commission without success. We've raised the issue with the California 
Supreme Court, but only one justice has ever voted to hear the case. Now, we could be 
dead wrong on this point. But the fact is, there's a 1977 unanimous decision of the 
Supreme Court that states otherwise. So we continue to raise the point. 
Now, if SB 1041 were enacted, we would have a court at some point issue a written 
decision, either reaffirming that old Supreme Court case and telling the Commission to 
conform its practice to the requirements of the statute, or telling us we're dead 
wrong, so that we can go on to more productive activities. Either result is perfectly 
fine with me, but the present result is simply intolerable. 
Now we and when I say "we" here I mean those of who participate before the 
Commission as well as the Commission itself who are affected -- receive nothing in the 
way of meaningful judicial review. Even if the first -- I think this is an important 
point -- even if the first year of judicial review under SB 1041 resulted in the 
Commission batting 1000 in the civil courts, SB 1041 will have achieved a great deal. 
The decisions upheld will bear a mark of legitimacy resulting from the fact that a 
court heard and considered the arguments of the appellants and rendered a decision 
explaining why the Commission was correct in all respects. That same level of 
legitimacy simply cannot result from a one sentence Supreme Court denial of a petition 
for a review. 
Last year the Court voted four to three not to hear TURN's appeal of a landmark 
telecommunications decision. And one of the commissioner's interpreted that vote as a 
quote, "clear indication that we're on the right track in telecommunications 
regulation." Now, the level of clarity from that vote wasn't apparent to me, but under 
the present law the commissioner is entitled to reach that conclusion. That's the 
inference he's allowed to draw from the fact that three Supreme Court justices weren't 
able to find a fourth vote to even hear the case. Had SB 1041 been in effect, some 
court would have rendered a written decision either providing some basis for the 
commissioner's statement in that regard, or reaching a contrary conclusion. 
Again, I'd like to thank the Senate for addressing these issues this year, and I'd 
be happy to answer any questions that you might have. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can you identify some of the problems that the groups that you 
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represent have been experiencing at the PUC? 
MR. MACBRIDE: I'd say the principal problem that we have experienced is the 
Commission's use of an advice letter procedure to, in essence, deregulate AT&T without 
conducting further hearings on the fashion in which it is to be deregulated. At the 
end of 1988 the Commission issued a decision establishing a procedure and a process, 
and it was our view that the Commission violated that by simply allowing AT&T to 
further deregulate itself with advice letter filings. 
Again, we took the issue to the court. We said, Section 728 of the Public Utility 
Code requires that you have a hearing. We pointed out to the Commission that they 
ignored our last filing, didn't do anything. We filed an application for rehearing. 
They dismissed it and said it was improvidently filed. We filed with the Supreme Court 
and got one vote. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. MACBRIDE: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, Audrie Krause. 
MS. AUDRIE KRAUSE: Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this 
issue. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Identify yourself and ••• 
MS. KRAUSE: Yes, I'm Audrie Krause, Executive Director of TURN. We strongly 
endorse the basic thrust of Senate Bills 1041 and 1042 and essentially support SB 1041 
as is, and would support SB 1042 with some amendments which I have provided, a list of 
our concerns in writing that I'll pass out later. 
We think the need for reform at the Public Utilities Commission has never been 
greater than it is at this point. There are severe process related problems that we're 
aware of in the telecommunications and transportation industries. And there are 
increasingly frequent examples of similar concerns coming up with the energy 
industries. The absence of any effective judicial review makes these problems even 
more serious, so we believe that review by the Court of Appeal is essential at this 
time. The mere presence of the review possibility, we believe, will help to curb some 
of the worst of the abuses that we've seen. And I'd like to give you a few examples of 
some recent Public Utilities Commission decisions that have had broad public impact 
which the Supreme Court has not reviewed. 
The Diablo Canyon case in which there was a contested settlement, the staff had 
recommended a $3.4 billion disallowance on a $5.6 billion, I believe it is, 
construction cost. A settlement was reached. It was contested, and the Court chose 
not to hear our request for a review. 
P.G.& E.'s residential electric customers are now paying over nine cents a kilowatt 
hour for the power they obtain from Diablo Canyon. It is the highest cost power in 
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P.G.& E.'s mix of power that's available, even higher than the much maligned Q.F.'s (?) 
contracts that are considered to be the highest in many cases. The Diablo Canyon power 
is actually more costly now, and P.G.& E. has been earning record profits. This is a 
serious impact on the public on millions of customers, and there -- without an 
effective way to get review this contested settlement stood. 
In regard to the alternative regulatory framework which Mr. MacBride just mentioned 
earlier, the Public Utilities Commission essentially disregarded nearly 100 years of 
ratemaking precedent to approve the alternative regulatory framework. It relies on 
arbitrary formulas which could result in rate increases at a time when there are 
declining costs in the industry. And since it was approved, we've seen increasing 
evidence of monopoly abuse, such as the 18 million in identified cross-subsidizations 
of Pacific Bell's non-regulated services which are being paid for by ratepayers, and 
the recent revelations regarding late charges and Pacific Bell's problems in handling 
the processing of payments on time. 
With regard to AT&T the Commission has allowed a rate increase without a hearing, 
despite the fact that that company earned a 39 percent profit in the first quarter of 
1990, which was three times its authorized rate of return. We believe that Senate Bill 
1041 would provide the opportunity for interested parties like TURN and other public 
interest groups to have their arguments considered on the merits of the arguments by a 
court. 
And I just want to add also that our support for appellate court review represents 
a change in position for TURN. We didn't always believe this was the best idea because 
we don't have the same kind of deep pockets that the utilities and some of the other 
special interests have. But we now feel that it's essential that there be this kind of 
review because of the problems that have been coming up with increasing frequency. 
And I'll answer any questions you have, and would like to hand out written comments 
with more detailed listing of some of our concerns. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Why do you think these conditions exist today, and perhaps 
didn't exist in earlier years? 
MS. KRAUSE: Well ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I mean, what's changed? 
MS. KRAUSE: Well, the Commission, of course changes leadership all the time. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I know. The Commission always changes its membership, so I 
don't want to put it on that basis. 
MS. KRAUSE: Other than that, it would be hard to speculate. Perhaps the fact that 
there hasn't been any effective review in many years has created a climate in which the 
Commission doesn't believe it needs to be reviewed. But we see increasing evidence 
that they disregard the factual record in deciding cases, knowing full well that 
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effectively there is no review. They can get away with that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You spoke about the ability to go to court. Do you have any 
comments about the ex parte procedure at the Commission? 
MS. KRAUSE: Yes, I do. In general, we would support the need for putting into 
code some form of ~ parte rule. We do have some specific problems with the bill as 
proposed, which I've included detailed comments on. We think that while the commission 
has recently reintroduced a proposed rule, they have done so in the past and not 
followed through, and we would have concerns about their follow-through in this case 
also, particularly since they moved on this after it was clear that there was interest 
by the Legislature in doing something about this problem. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Joel Anderson. 
MR. JOEL ANDERSON: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal. My name is Joel Anderson. I'm 
Vice President and Chief of Staff of the California Trucking Association. Our 
organization is a trade association representing about 2,500 trucking companies in the 
State of California. Their average size is 10 to 15 drivers, maybe 15 to 20 employees, 
revenue of about $1 million a year, small business type people. 
And we probably have the singular distinction, along with the railroads, of being 
the first regulated utilities in California, unlike the rest who are regulated by 
statute. We're regulated by Constitution as part of a transportation company, which 
gives us a unique set of problems, but the impact of which has been the same as spoken 
by Mr. MacBride and Ms. Krause. I'd like to address both aspects of the bill -- the 
judicial review and the ~ parte rule. 
Regarding judicial review, Tom spoke about a 1977 case. That was a case that CTA 
litigated against the Commission and won, and it was a case that said that every party 
is entitled to a fair hearing and an opportunity to be heard before the Commission. 
Since the Supreme Court made that landmark decision on an advice letter type procedure 
which we took the court and won, there's been a steady retreat from that -- not in 
terms of the active voice of the justices, but in terms of the leeway that justices 
give the Commission in their actions. 
You may recall that we approached you when the Commission first set upon to redo 
its 1986 transportation decision. And it compounded one day of hearing after another 
and put such a compressed hearing schedule that for anyone outside of government to 
participate in a meaningful fashion was impossible in terms of financial strain, 
logistic strain, and getting your witnesses there. Fortunately, through intervention 
the schedule became more reasonable, but at the first hearing or just before the first 
hearing we had Commissioner Wilk tell us when the decision would be issued by the 
Commission before the first shred of evidence was submitted to the Commission for 
adjudication. We find that intolerable behavior, and we're glad that it backed down a 
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bit. 
We don't think that behavior could occur if there were meaningful review by the 
court. We later took the Commission up to the Court, and like Mr. MacBride, we got two 
votes out of seven, four being needed for review. We think in a prior era we'd of got 
the review, but now there's automatic appeal death sentences, all other kinds of things 
going to the court, and so their attention is directed away from commercial cases which 
it was more active in the '70's. 
We strongly support SB 1041 on the level of review and an opportunity to be heard 
at the Court on the merits of the case. We don't want to retry the case, but we want 
to make sure that it's heard and the Commission acted in accordance with law. 
The second issue, SB 1042 dealing with the ~ parte rule, we're about 50 percent in 
support of the bill. our problem with the bill is we think we should have a right to 
approach the commissioners on the quasi legislative cases. We think you have an 
absolute right to address the decision makers there at all times. But in terms of 
enforcement cases, in terms of cases dealing with the issuance of a certificate of an 
adjudicatory proceeding which we think could be more narrowly defined than present in 
the bill, we would strongly support it. We think there is no appropriate means or no 
business of an ~ parte contact in those type cases so. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Do you have any problem with the disclosure of subject matter? 
MR. ANDERSON: Not at all. We would fully that any time we meet a 
commissioner the commissioner would note it down and report it. We don't have any 
problem being noticed. 
In summary, we think these bills are long overdue. We applaud you for moving 
forward with them. We will testify in support. In those areas where we have 
opposition we'll let you know, like on the~ parte rule. We think one of the impacts 
on the Legislature of the lack of judicial review and fairness at the Commission has 
been you've been forced to be involved much more than you ever have in the past When 
the Commission played by fairer rules in our opinion, they handled the matters. The 
Legislature gave the Commission policy. Now you're being forced to go back and correct 
things on a micro level. It's bad public policy, but you're required to do it because 
of what is occurring over there. 
We thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Why do you think there's been this increasing concern over the 
past few years with respect to the fairness of the process? 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, we've litigated before the Commission since 1934, and never in 
our history did we have a commissioner tell us the first day of hearing when the 
decision would be out and what days we'd have to brief and what could be expected. 
Now, that's an extraordinary statement. Unfortunately-- actually, the commissioner 
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didn't say it. The assigned law judge said it after he had -- said been in 
consultation with the commissioner, and he made sure he said it off the record, but 
there were many ears to hear it. We've never experienced that before. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you comment upon the concept of the ALJs in the bill. 
MR. ANDERSON: Well, you know, last year we came with a suggestion that the ALJs 
actually be separated from the Commission and assigned to a different office in the 
State of California-- I believe the Office of Administrative Law. That's what we'd 
prefer to see happen. This legislation moves a step in that direction, and we would 
support it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, thank you very much. Mr. DiVirgilio. 
MR. PHILLIP DIVIRGILIO: Chairman Rosenthal, distinguished members of the 
committee, my name is Phillip DiVirgilio. I'm Manager of Government Affairs for DESTEC 
Energy. I'm pleased to appear today before you on behalf of both the California 
Cogeneration Council and the California Independent Energy Producers. I serve as Chair 
of electric issues for the California Cogeneration Council, an ad hoc group of 
industrial companies who have installed gas-fired cogeneration facilities. Also I'm 
Chairman of Independent Energy Producers, an umbrella organization representing all 
forms of alternative energy production in California. 
Our groups have strong interest in fairness and integrity of the proceedings at the 
Public Utilities Commission. our companies spend considerable amounts of time and 
money participating in a multitude of PUC proceedings. Generally, we find ourselves as 
adversaries of the regulated utility companies. We're forced to hire attorneys and 
expert witnesses to counter the massive efforts of the utilities to lower the payments 
of our energy and in general to make us less of a competitive threat. We'd like to 
commend Senator Roberti for introducing these two important pieces of legislation which 
we believe will improve the procedural due process of the PUC. 
Looking at each bill individually -- first, Senate Bill 1041 we generally 
support the concept of effective judicial review of PUC decisions. We believe that all 
regulatory agencies should be subject to judicial review. The present system of direct 
appeal to the state Supreme Court makes it virtually impossible for any party to 
question Commission decisions. The Supreme Court is just too busy; very unlikely that 
they will hear most cases, and therefore they're not a true oversight of Commission 
actions. This is of particular concern to our group, since our industry relies heavily 
on the statutory direction given by the Legislature to the PUC. 
And as an example, Senator Rosenthal, you carried legislation in 1984 that directed 
the PUC on how to set prices for natural gas for cogenerators. The PUC has virtually 
ignored major elements of that law in recent years. And unfortunately, it's not 
practical for us to appeal these very technical PUC decisions to the State Supreme 
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Court, and as a consequence we've been forced to ask you to carry new legislation 
making this law more explicit so that the will of the Legislature can be carried out. 
At the same time that we see benefits in an appellate court review of PUC 
decisions, we do have a major concern. OUr industry bears its own cost for appearing 
before the PUC and for appealing to any courts. The utilities, on the other hand, have 
all their costs borne by the ratepayers. This includes their staff, lawyers, and any 
consultants in supporting their cases. And making court review easier may prompt the 
utility companies to challenge every adverse PUC ruling. Simply, they down have a 
down-side risk. We would like to ask you to consider amending the bill so that if a 
utility appeals and loses, their shareholders will bear the cost of that appeal. 
Now, our fears here are not a matter of conjecture, but actually a matter of fact. 
We were victims of a campaign by P.G.& E. to disadvantage our industry. They once 
appealed a very minor and very technical PUC decision that went against them all the 
way up to the u.s. Supreme Court. They lost at every level, and ratepayers had to pay 
all the legal fees. Our industry, unfortunately, was forced to respond and respond at 
our own costs, so we feel this bill should safeguard against utilities launching 
frivolous appeals. 
Turning to Senate Bill 1042, we support the major provisions of this bill. We 
support the time periods for assigning ALJs, but also ask you to look at including time 
periods for scheduling hearings and scheduling -- and rendering decisions. 
Many times we've protested utility actions, only to find the Commission has simply 
refused to deal with our protests. They do not schedule hearings or even workshops; in 
some cases, never rendered a decision. We feel no party should have to wonder whether 
it will be able to receive a hearing on a legitimate issue. 
Regarding the ~ parte rule, we can support a stronger rule, although we feel that 
the rule as written is perhaps a little too sweeping. We're content to win or lose 
based on the facts that we present in the record. However, sometimes we find it 
helpful to clarify our issues in direct conversation. The bill as drafted makes ~ 
parte contact a misdemeanor, which we believe is a bit onerous, and some form of 
reporting requirements is probably more appropriate. 
The bill also limits the commissioners to the facts or determinations made by the 
ALJ, and we feel this goes too far. This makes the ALJ the single decision maker, and 
we feel it's wrong. However, if the commissioners depart from the factual findings of 
the ALJ we do feel they should identify those facts in the record that justify their 
conclusions. We don't feel this is a large burden and we feel it will contribute to a 
reasoned decision making process. 
We appreciate the leadership that you've shown on these important issues, and we 
look forward to working with you and members of both committees as this legislation 
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comes forward. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Dennis Mangers. 
MR. DENNIS MANGERS: Mr. Chairman and members, Dennis Mangers; Senior Vice 
President, California Cable Television Association. I have some printed support 
testimony I'd like to make available if I may. 
And I'd like to just share with you a couple of thoughts about these bills. I 
can't say that as a member, Mr. Chairman and Senator Alquist, I ever paid much 
attention to the PUC. It seems to me -- it seemed to be at the time that we created 
this entity for a specific purpose. It seemed to me to be pursuing that purpose, and 
it was dealing in a very complex area of public policy that I for one was very glad to 
have them pursuing it, and so that I didn't have to spend a great deal of time looking 
at it. 
I have to also admit that in the early days of this job representing the cable 
television industry I didn't pay much attention either, because the only purview that 
the PUC had that affected my industry had to do with public safety issues, and so we 
had a few engineers and a few technical people watching over the whole issue for us, 
that whole arena. 
It then came, however, as the cable industry became more and more successful, that 
the telephone companies made it abundantly clear they intended to get into the cable 
business. And they made it abundantly clear they were going to work the congressional 
level, they were going to work with the FCC, and they were going to work with the 
various state PUCs to facilitate their getting into that business. 
We, obviously, became nervous because they had exhibited behaviors in the past that 
led to the breakup of AT&T, and we knew that if they could they'd cross-subsidize their 
way into our business and we could be gone. So I want emphasize from the beginning, it 
doesn't get very complicated to us. It's simple. Life and death matters as they 
affect the cable television industry are being decided over there in that 
legislative-created body all the time. And we're here today to tell you that we 
support these bills. We believe something and this is the rule we have around 
here -- we believe something is broke and it does need fixing, and these bills would go 
a long way to doing precisely that. 
Now let me be specific in this regard. With regard to the three issues involved in 
these bills, what could be the harm in this agency having some level of appellate 
review of its decisions? Can you imagine how sobering it is when your industry is 
under the threat mine is from the telco incursion to know that once the PUC makes a 
decision that could be life and death for your industry, that's where it stops, 
friends. It doesn't go anywhere else, and you don't have much additional latitude. If 
the Supreme Court, as Tom MacBride just suggested, doesn't take these cases and that's 
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the only thing set up in our law, what do you do? Well for us, some provision for 
appellate review is absolutely essential, and we strongly support the concept. 
What could be wrong with the independence of the ALJ? Do you know how that works? 
I just came to discover this. You go over and you watch these administrative law 
judges that are assigned to these hearings. They listen carefully to all the evidence. 
They're there every day and they see every nuance. They see the interplay of the 
people. Then they write up a report. You know what happens to the report? The public 
doesn't see this thing. This goes to an assigned commissioner that in many cases has 
been out giving speeches, writing articles, and expressing a philosophical viewpoint. 
And guess what? Sometimes that report of the ALJ comes out and it reflects very 
accurately the philosophy of the assigned commissioner to the case. Big surprise. 
And you know what? It doesn't become public until that assigned commissioner gets 
to revise it anyway he or she wants to. So what the public gets to see is not what the 
ALJ reported after hearing this case as a law judge. We get to hear what the assigned 
commissioner, who didn't even come to the hearing, thinks. Well boy, I'll tell you, it 
sounds to me like some reform is necessary in that category. 
Now, with regard to~ parte contact, what's the harm in having some rules that 
require contact with commissioners on issues of this magnitude to be recorded -- who 
was there and what they had to say so that the press and all of the competitors can 
take a look at the record and decide what was the magnitude of the impact, or the 
impact on the commissioners before they made some of these controversial decisions so 
that the public and all of us -- and I think especially you legislators -- can begin to 
get a flavor for is that a fair and equitable process? 
As I said, I didn't used to get very concerned. Now, the level or magnitude of 
threat to the industry is so great, our fate is so much in the hands of the PUC 
commissioners, we need to guarantee that the Legislature is watching, that they don't 
just abdicate entirely the authority to that body, and that they are aware that all is 
not totally fair and equitable. So while I can't list a whole litany of problems to 
date, I can tell you, knowing what's coming ahead for my industry, I want to 
proactively come over here and support these two bills and ask you to make sure that 
that process through which my industry is probably going to go for the next decade, 
with life-or-death consequences, is fair and is equitable. And these two bills, simply 
stated, do it, and I urge your support. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What do you think of the PUC's recently proposed rules on~ 
parte communications? 
MR. MANGERS: Personally, we have recommended some amendments to SB 1042 that I 
think would work better because they apply to the workshop process that's been 
developed in this deregulatory environment since last fall, so we'd like to discuss 
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further with the Senator both what the PUC has recommended and what we think would be 
more equitable for everyone. So we're not entirely satisfied with the status of the 
bill, but I don't want to nit-pick it to death in this informational hearing. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Mr. McDonald. 
MR. JOHN P. McDONALD: Thank you. My name is John P. McDonald. I'm Vice President 
and General Counsel of Connelley Information Publishing. Connelley Information 
Publishing publishes 18 directories -- telephone directories -- in Southern California. 
For the most part we did not expect to have any involvement with the Public 
Utilities Commission when we opened our operations here in California. We thought we 
had a fairly simple matter. Telephone directories need telephone listings, and while I 
won't go into the actual merits of what did or didn't go on in terms of what we asked 
for, the process that we went through was just fascinating. 
It began almost six years ago. We asked for access to listings and were told that 
we could not have them because the PUC said we couldn't. We went to the PUC and said, 
why can't we have this? And they said, because it's not in the tariff. When we asked 
how to go about addressing getting something into the tariff, we were told first to 
intervene in an OII -- order initiating investigation -- that was dealing with rate 
reform. We intervened in that proceeding, and shortly after intervening were told, no, 
you're in the wrong proceeding. The issue you seek to raise here cannot be raised in 
this proceeding. You have to go someplace else. 
Our alternative was to take and file a complaint case, so we went and filed a 
complaint case before the Commission and were proceeding along that avenue. We also 
took and filed a request with the Commission to expand the OII to include the issues 
that we thought were important. They clearly dealt with regulation and reform. 
After we were well into the complaint case, the administrative law judge in that 
case informed us that in fact we could not raise a major portion of our case in the 
complaint case either. It appeared that we as a customer of the utility didn't have 
standing to raise issues that may relate to the reasonableness of the tariffs. It was 
the tariffs that we were trying to change. Having had the complaint case largely 
gutted by this ruling, we were surprised to find the OII directing others interested in 
our issues to participate in our complaint case. We thought we had a nice, simple 
dispute. 
This proceeded along until the OII or regulatory reform came out. We were 
absolutely stunned to find a bunch of factual findings about the extensive record on 
directory needs and on listings issues. We hadn't been allowed to put those issues 
into the case. 
The complaint case concluded and we sat for nearly a year waiting for an order from 
the Commission. We finally took and filed a motion with the Commission simply asking 
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them to rule. Rather than ruling they started yet another OII, this one directed to 
listings. After that proceeding had started they did take and come and rule on our 
initial complaint. They ruled that we should wait until the OII to find final 
resolution. It seemed to me we were back to where we started. 
The changes to the Commission's procedure that are set forth in SB 1041 and SB 1042 
we think will go a long way to solving those sorts of problems. We have experienced in 
the course of our travels through the assorted regulatory processes of the PUC many of 
the problems that are addressed in these bills. We're particularly concerned about 
decisions that are rendered citing facts that are nowhere to be found in the record. 
When our complaint case was finally decided, nearly 60 percent of the material in that 
case related to things that never appeared in that record. They were nowhere to be 
found. They represented things that we had had no opportunity to confront. Indeed, 
there were factual findings about proceedings that had not even been noticed for 
hearing yet. There needs to be a change in the way the PUC does its business. 
I think that probably in the past its method of operating, where you were dealing 
with utilities that were simply in the business that they were in, may have been 
appropriate. In today's world where the utilities are in a variety of businesses 
some of them regulated, some of them unregulated -- the need for the commission to sit 
meaningfully as an arbiter of disputes to provide dispute resolution is very important. 
Having proceedings on the record, having them noticed, having a right of appeal; 
knowing that the real proceeding is there in the hearing room and not out in the 
hallway someplace are all things that are very, very important to this process. 
We support the bills. We urge the Legislature to continue their oversight. We 
don't think that the bills by themselves will do enough to change the practices that 
evolved over such a long period of time. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. I want to thank the panel participants 
for this number one. We'll know call forth the Panel II: The PUC; the President, Ms. 
Eckert and the Acting General Counsel, Michael Day. At your convenience you may start. 
MS. PATRICIA ECKERT: Good afternoon. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Good afternoon. 
MS. ECKERT: I'd like to thank you, Chairman Rosenthal, and the committees for 
their invitation to address SB 1041 and SB 1042 today. 
My fellow commissioners and I consider these two to be two of the most important 
bills on the Legislature's agenda because of their potential impact on the workings of 
the Commission. I would like to address SB 1041, the appellate review bill, first. 
As we have in the past, the Commission continues to feel very strongly that 
modifying the original scheme for expedited review of CPUC decisions directly to the 
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California Supreme Court is a mistake. Such modification will degrade the ratemaking 
process in California. The possibility of benefits from additional court review will 
not outweight the harm. 
Let me briefly explain our major reasons for opposing SB 1041. Number one: There 
will be no reduction of court workload. It is not true that the bill will reduce the 
workload of the Supreme Court. In fact, there will be a significant increase in the 
workload of both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. A reduction in court 
workload has been the major justification for the bill. However, both sides of the 
issue now concede that the additional appeals expected in the lower courts will likely 
increase the number of petitions ultimately reaching the Supreme Court. And of course, 
there will be a substantial increase in the workload of the First Appellate District, 
which is already a very busy court in its own right. 
Number Two: The existing appellate procedures were crafted for a reason -- a good 
reason. There's a reason the Public Utilities Act provided for expedited direct review 
to the Supreme Court. That reason is still valid today. The appellate review 
provisions of the Public Utilities Act of 1911 were drafted by Commissioner and General 
Counsel Max Thelen after an extensive survey of procedures in other states. As 
Thelen's report stated, "It is hoped that the procedure thus provided will tend to 
prevent the long drawn-out court proceedings and the reliance on technicalities to 
which the public utilities have largely resorted in other states to tie the hands of 
the states acting through their railroad or public service commissions." 
As the Commission's own report in 1912 stated, quote, the provisions of the Public 
Utilities Act with reference to procedure have been drawn with considerable care so as 
to ensure swiftness and certainty in the proceedings, both before the Commission and 
the courts. In this way it is possible to secure speedily a decision of the highest 
court of the state. 
Number three: SB 1041 would eliminate the most important elements of the original 
appellate procedure. It proposes to eliminate direct discretionary appeal to the 
Supreme Court, no right of automatic appeal, court deference to the Commission on 
factual determinations, and a limitation on the action may take to either affirm or set 
aside the order of the Commission. These elements are all important if utilities and 
their customers are to have any real regulatory certainty in this day and age, just as 
they were important when the progressive reformers were battling the railroads. 
Now, however, the Commission's main litigation opponents are far more numerous, and 
many are just as well funded and well equipped, with as many able lawyers as the 
railroads at the turn of the century. In addition, utility regulation has become more 
complex and its economic impact affects millions more of the state's citizens and 
businesses. Today it's easier than ever to choose a commission decision at random, 
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find several willing litigants who would seek to overturn that decision. There are 
simply more winners and losers, and we were hearing many of those stories in the panel 
that just proceeded us. 
In addition, the competitive forces unleashed in the regulatory field today give 
parties an incentive to use litigation as a weapon to frustrate their competititors. 
This has progressed to the point where the Commission has admonished parties from the 
bench for filing rehearings or appeals solely to delay their competitor's rate 
approvals. SB 1041 would give these parties powerful new weapons for further delay. 
And I'd like Mr. Day at the end of my comments to comment and reply to a couple of the 
comments that were incorrect in Panel I. We would like to clarify a couple of those. 
What harmful impacts would result from SB 1041? Well to begin, the added layer of 
appeal would add 12 to 18 months to each appellate case, which already takes from three 
to 18 months, assuming the losing party at the court of appeals takes it to the Supreme 
Court. Thus we could face three years of delay before a Commission decision is final. 
Further, this regulatory uncertainty costs time, money, effort, and can ruinously 
frustrate a well thought through regulatory program. Many federal agencies such as 
FERC are subject to a right of automatic appeal to intermediate federal courts, and 
their major policy decisions are routinely tied up in lengthy court battles. 
For example, the FERC began to order open access to natural gas in 1984. Here we 
are in 1991 and they're still grappling with elementary questions, such as how can 
parties trade capacity rights. This is because every one of their orders has been 
subject to appeal. Each appeal lasts over two years, and frequently the Court has 
overturned a portion of a key decision after it's been partially implemented. We can 
only urge you not to place California's economy in that type of purgatory. 
In addition, the current CPUC appellate procedure provides tangible dollar benefits 
by providing a speedy final decision. A rate case increase or reduction in rates, if 
held up for an additional 12 to 18 months, could result in the accrual of vast sums of 
interest which would have to be paid once a final order has been reached, either by 
shareholders or ratepayers. Even if the order of the Commission is not stayed and the 
refund or increase in rate takes effect, parties will have to encumber the money which 
they have collected, or which may have to be paid until the Court's decision is final. 
For example, in 1987 General Telephone challenged approximately $33 million of a 
Commission rate reduction order, and in 1988 Pacific Bell challenged over $100 million 
of a rate reduction order. If the commission orders had been stayed and then reversed, 
the resulting interest cost would have run into tens of millions of dollars, and such 
uncertainty is a severe burden on both businessmen and individual ratepayers. Do you 
as legislators want the responsibility in this example for loading tens of millions of 
dollars of interest payments onto the backs of ratepayers? 
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Further, granting an appeal of right in every case, instead of the current 
discretionary appeal, would very likely increase the number of appeals enormously, 
further clogging the civil appeals process and our decision making. The CPUC issues an 
average of 400 to 450 decisions a year which are not on the consent calendar. Even if 
half of the losing parties avail themselves of the automatic appeal right, the number 
of appeals to the CPUC decisions will increase from 15 per year to 200 to 225, an 
increase of up to 1,500 percent. 
What's worse is that SB 1041 allows the Court to ignore the factual findings and 
conclusions of the Commission -- it was these types of complaints we were just 
listening to in Panel I -- and to take new evidence which has never been addressed in 
the Commission's proceedings. And as you know, this is very complex material. 
We strongly oppose this provision for two reasons. It will require the court to 
consider technical evidence without the benefit of full cross-examination by all 
parties to our cases. 
weighing such evidence. 
It will deprive the Commission of its primary function of 
If the courts were equipped to take all the evidence and make 
policy decisions in regulatory cases, no Public Utilities Commission would ever have 
been created. Instead, our Constitution calls for a Commission which specializes in 
utility regulation vested with great discretion. In addition, the Public Utilities Act 
for the reasons I mentioned above provides for expedited court review on limited 
grounds. It specifically prohibits a trial de novo, which SB 1041 would essentially 
allow. 
Even if the bill were passed, it could never be effectively implemented as written. 
Everyone speculates that the bill will generate vastly more appellate work for the 
Commission, yet the bill provides none of the resources needed by the Commission in 
terms of additional lawyers to defend our decisions. 
And finally, the bill provides that if the Commission grants rehearing, a party may 
appeal to the Court if the Commission does not act within 90 days. This deadline is 
simply impossible to meet. The Commission must grant rehearing, assign an ALJ, take 
testimony, permit briefs to be filed, prepare a proposed decision, allow the parties 30 
days to comment on the decision before we can issue a final order. This simply cannot 
be done in 90 days, and it cannot be reasonably be done in less than three to six 
months in certain complex cases. Such a deadline is effectively useless. If the 
Commission grants rehearing the party will have to wait for a Commission decision on 
rehearing before applying to the court. 
The current system does not provide an effective means of review of CPUC decisions. 
The number of the parties here today have expressed the notion that there is no 
effective review of the Commission's decisions at this time. We respectfully disagree. 
Our own study of other state agencies whose orders are subject to discretionary appeal 
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to the Courts of Appeal report that one out of every eight or 10 appeals is accepted. 
At the Commission over the last three years one out of every 14 appeals has been 
accepted by the Court. If you eliminate the appeals which were clearly frivolous or 
non-meritorious, the ratio was one case accepted out of every eight -- well within the 
range of the other agencies. 
We are wholly unpersuaded that parties have a less effective right of appeal from 
CPUC cases, and we attribute the low number of cases accepted to our rehearing process. 
The commission's process allows us to correct many minor and some major flaws in our 
decisions before they are appealed to the court. 
In summary, this procedural proposal has been strongly opposed by the Commission 
for the last three years. We see SB 1041 as defective in the same manner as the other 
proposals, and we urge you to reject the bill and retain the carefully crafted 
appellate process, which was designed specifically to meet the needs of utility 
regulation in California. 
Just as a final note on SB 1041, I noted with interest a recent LA Times article in 
which the attorney for the Legislature expressed his pleasure that the Supreme Court 
had agreed to hear the lawsuit over Prop. 140 immediately rather than waiting for a 
lower court review, because this was a case of "statewide importance." The attorney 
specifically referred to the fact that the expedited appeal would allow a decision to 
be rendered before the next fiscal year begins when the mandate and costs would occur. 
we rely on precisely the same reasoning to urge you that our cases be heard 
expeditiously. Many of our decisions have statewide economic ramifications that total 
hundreds of millions of dollars. So long as the parties have a fair opportunity to 
appeal our decisions and our cases do not unduly burden the court, no case can be made 
for lengthy delays in the appellate process for the CPUC. 
And Mr. Day, would you like to just set the record straight on a couple of the 
items of testimony in Panel I. 
MR. MICHAEL DAY: The three things I would just briefly mention is with regard to 
the ALJ-commissioner relationship. It is a mischaracterization to say that the ALJ's 
independent judgment in evaluating the record is not made part of the proposed 
decision. Section 311, specifically including the statute amendments from a few years 
ago which this committee participated in, do provide that the ALJ's proposed decision 
is submitted to public comment. The public does see and comment on that decision. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me break in here. Can you comment on the concept which 
said that the decision was made on the basis of testimony or information that was never 
presented. 
MR. DAY: Well, I'm not going to comment on the specifics of one particular case 
that's mentioned, but to the extent any party can determine that that was the case, 
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that's legal error. But we reject the notion generally that that occurs in PUC 
decisions. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. I see a little smirking around the audience behind you. 
So, you know, one of the things that comes through to me is that -- I'm not suggesting 
that the legislation solves in the best way, but I do suggest to you that there's a lot 
of smoke around, and where there's smoke there's some fire. And there's an indication 
that something has changed from what existed previously. 
And I think maybe one of the reasons we see the changes is that we went from a 
monopoly situation, okay, to a breakup of those monopolies, which changes everything 
and suggests to me that something which was in effect in 1909 because of a monopoly 
railroad and which existed until the deregulation came into effect a number of years, 
that it needs to be reviewed in terms of how one appeals. 
MR. DAY: If I could comment, Senator, I think that you're quite correct that the 
source of the additional complaints about the process is the fact that there are many 
more winners and losers when we have a competitive industry. But that does not mean 
that the procedure itself is broken. Many of the people you heard here complained not 
really because of the procedure, but because they lost on the policy issues. And the 
thing that everybody has to realize is that even if every single Commission decision 
were appealed to the Supreme Court, and somehow the Supreme Court could be compelled to 
issue a decision in every case, they wouldn't necessarily win any more of the policy 
decisions, because regulatory agencies are granted such extreme latitude. The Supreme 
Court of the u.s. has made that very clear. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I have never raised the question about the results, the 
policy. What I've raised for the last eight years that I've been on this committee is 
the process. And the process hasn't improved, in my opinion, because on every issue we 
get involved in some part of the process; somebody is saying, well, 'it was speeded 
up.' Somebody made a decision before it was going to be happening. You know, I 
couldn't get -- I couldn't hear because I couldn't compete with the utilities number of 
attorneys that were involved -- on and on and on so that my concern throughout this 
whole process, and I think -- Senator Roberti, I'm glad you're here too -- has been the 
process, not whether somebody wins or loses. 
MS. ECKERT: Well, as you know, I've just issued an assigned commissioner's ruling 
with respect to the ex parte rule, and I would if I could like to address that in my 
comments with respect to SB 1042. 
We urged the rejection of the provision of this bill as well. The most 
controversial aspect of the bill is the mandated ~ parte rule, which would certainly 
have a very chilling effect on the Commission's decision making process. And as I 
mentioned, on March 22 of this year I issued an assigned commissioner's ruling in our 
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ongoing procedural docket which distributed for comment a proposed ~ parte rule. Our 
proposed rule is a sunshine rule which will clearly inhibit -- and that's something you 
and I have talked about for the two years I've been on the Commission. And the rule is 
out there and I think that -- and we're very aware of the comments that are coming in 
on it, and we intend to put this rule into place. 
And our proposed rule will clearly inhibit the majority of ~ parte contacts, but 
yet it will ensure that communications between the commissioners and the parties on 
important policy issues are not cut off completely. And I think you've heard some 
sentiment for that in Panel I as well. Furthermore, it provides parties with the right 
to rebuttal if these so choose whenever a contact is made. The rule would apply from 
the submission of the case that is, after the hearings and briefings are 
concluded -- until a final decision. 
It's our firmly held belief that a Commission -- as a Commission that no~ parte 
rule should be imposed on the Commission by the Legislature, certainly not one with the 
inflexibility of SB 1042. The Commission can and will control its own procedures to 
maintain the integrity of our proceedings and to make certain that every appearance of 
fairness is maintained in its proceedings. And as you know, you and I have spent a lot 
of time talking about the process, and I am deeply dedicated to putting that into 
place. I think you know my dedication to that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I think that that may be so about this Commission. One of my 
concerns is that if it's good, it ought to be a law -- if it's good. Now, because I 
don't want the next Commission, whoever that happens to be, to make some other 
determination which is different. 
The other thing I'd like to make comment about: I'm not sure that this would have 
happened if there wasn't a bill around here saying, hey, there's something wrong. And 
so maybe what you're doing is correct. But what would be wrong with putting it into 
law? 
MS. ECKERT: Well, one of the major problems is that it's terribly over-broad as 
it's drafted right now. It applies strict courtroom-like~ parte rules to contacts 
very similar to those the Legislature has with constituents. And by that I mean, the 
Commission is frequently engaged in policy making, which is far more legislative in 
character than a judicial determination of an individual's property rights or fitness 
for licensing. 
In fact, there's an excellent article written by an Ohio commissioner in the ABA 
Natural Resources Journal. It's entitled, "The Over-Judicialization of the Regulatory 
Process." And the point he makes is a really good one, and that is we want to bring 
information in so we can create the best policies, but we want to do it fairly. We 
want to have the right amount of access. In other words, not a closed door but fair 
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access, getting back to the process concerns. It's neither practical nor prudent for 
commissioners to avoid all ex parte contacts. We simply cannot schedule an en bane 
argument in every case, nor are there enough hearing rooms or commissioners to do so. 
But we need to make inquires of the parties, and I think under the sunshine the 
proposed assigned commissioner's ruling under the sunshine rule -- we can create such a 
rule. 
And I think that the key flaw in the bill, though, is the misperception that all 
our proceedings are like licensing hearings. We need to get this input. We need to do 
this in our kind of unusual situation where we're somewhat legislative in nature, 
somewhat judicial, and appointed by the executive branch. 
For example, in the recent Camp Meeker Water case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that utility ratemaking by our Commission is fundamentally legislative in character and 
not adjudicative. Thus we have a legitimate need for communication with the parties on 
policy determinations. And I think you heard in Panel I an interest to have that type 
of communication. But what's important what's more important than denying access ••• 
MR. DAY: ••• came up with that California Supreme Court. 
SENATOR DAVID ROBERTI: The Supreme Court? 
MR. DAY: Yes. 
MS. ECKERT: A recent one. What's more important than denying access is to ensure 
fair access, and our proposed rule would do that. And that gets -- it returns once 
again, Senator Rosenthal, to the process issues that we've talked about. We thought 
about this a lot. We've given this a lot of thought, and it's a good-faith setting 
forth of the rule that we intend to put into place. So also we feel that the 
flexibility to craft our own rules for specific cases as you know, we've created a 
strict ex parte rule in the Edison merger case. This is working. It prohibits the 
parties from communication with decision makers. In certain cases of this type of --
or of this importance where less policy and more adjudication is at stake, such rules 
may be preferable, but we would certainly like the -- be allowed to make that judgment 
rather than suffering from these very restrictive rules. 
Let me just comment for a moment on the role of the ALJs, if I may. We also 
strongly oppose the provisions of SB 1042 with respect to the ALJs. By making ALJ 
findings of fact binding on the Commission, this bill would take the ultimate authority 
for decision making and policy making out of the hands of the commissioner and place it 
in the hands of the ALJs. They are not constitutional officers. They're not entrusted 
with the authority to regulate utilities, but the commissioners are. There's no system 
of government that we're aware of that would grant the authority to civil servants 
unaccountable to either the electorate or the executive branch, yet our cases are so 
complex that the legal standards for reasonable of rates so strict that the power to 
-21-
make binding findings of fact equals the power to determine the outcome of the case. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Now let me just break in, okay. And I have told commissioners 
this forever. They have to make the final decision, but if in fact ALJs are in fact 
directed as to the results that should be obtained, which has been said on and over and 
over again, okay. See, I don't have a problem with an ALJ listening to the testimony, 
making some recommendation. That ought to be available at that point for comment. 
If the commissioners want to disregard it completely and make another decision, 
that's fine as far as I'm concerned. That's their responsibility. 
MS. ECKERT: (Inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. But if in fact something has changed -- so now the 
ALJ's decision does not get exposed to the light, goes to the commissioner first, gets 
modified and then is exposed to the light, I'm not sure that we're getting what we 
ought to be getting. 
MS. ECKERT: Mr. Day indicated he'd like to respond to that. 
MR. DAY: I would just like to respond, Senator, that as your own committee's 
background report for this hearing indicated, there's statutory evidence to the fact 
that the ALJs were never intended to have an independent decision they created all on 
there own, but were in fact assigned to assist the commissioner in hearing the cases. 
That's Section 310 and 311. Your own people have mentioned that it can be interpreted 
both ways. 
The historical practice of the Commission is very obviously that the assigned ALJs 
are there to assist the commissioners in preparing a decision. Now the fact that the 
ALJ's proposed decision is now published for comment is a fine procedural reform, but 
we would say that does not necessarily mean that there can be no communication between 
the ALJ and the commissioner. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, no. Tell me what's changed in the last two years or three 
years. 
MR. DAY: Nothing. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
that it's not the same. 
The procedure is exactly the same as it's been. 
Not exactly the same. Not the same. We've heard from ALJ's 
We've heard from people who had testimony before ALJs in which 
something else happened. It's not the same. I don't know what took place that 
changed. 
MR. DAY: If people have communicated that they're unhappy with the relationship --
the working relationship -- between an assigned ALJ and the assigned commissioner, and 
that that's somehow new, they're simply not aware with how the Commission's been 
practicing since 1912, because that is a long-standing practice. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And no ALJ's decision was public before it went to a 
commissioner previous to the last three or four years? 
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MR. DAY: Well, before Section 311 was amended to include the publishing of an 
ALJ's decision, that's correct. There were no proposed decisions published either by 
the Commission or by the ALJs. That is new. That is a new statutory change, and of 
course, we're complying with that. 
MS. ECKERT: With Section 311 it is working. As a commissioner and with two years 
of experience, I have -- in none of the cases where I've been assigned commissioner 
have I ever had a problem with an ALJ. We'll sit down. They'll say, here's my game 
plan. I say, you hear the evidence. Let's take a look at the record. Write your 
decision, and we team play it. And I have not had any of those problems. I don't know 
where those complaints are coming from. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Madam President, you may not be the problem. 
MS. ECKERT: Well, I'd sure like to be part of a solution where we get to keep some 
ability to ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I'm trying to get you to be part of the solution. 
MR. DAY: Well, the thing I would say about SB 1042 that you do have to realize is 
that it goes so far in that direction that if you do allow ALJ findings of fact to be 
binding on the Commission, you have ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't want it to be binding. I don't want them to be 
binding. 
MR. DAY: Then if all you're looking for is an advisory opinion as to what the ALJ 
thinks should be in the findings, in fact we're at that situation now. The 
commissioners do not dictate findings of fact and conclusions of law in proposed 
decisions. The vast majority of them are prepared by the ALJs in the course of the 
hearing. Commissioners are looking at policy perspectives at that stage of the 
proceeding. And to characterize it as the assigned commissioners dictating every 
little individual 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Not every little ••• 
MR. DAY: That's not the case. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Come on. You're really begging the issue here. It is not 
that they outline every little bitty part that comes out. But commissioners have 
ALJs have said to us, and it's no secret -- some of them may not be there anymore 
because they were forceful enough to make their opinions known. But something has 
changed in the process, and I'm concerned about the process. I'm not concerned about 
the decision, either the ALJ's decision or the commissioner's decision. That's the 
commissioner's responsibility. 
MR. DAY: Well, then I would think the key issue would be whether or not the 
initial findings were drafted by the ALJ or the assigned commissioner when the 
Commission issues its final decision. If there is evidence in the record to support 
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the findings adopted by the full Commission, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned 
there will be no review of findings of fact. The Commission's discretion will be 
upheld. And that has not changed. 
MS. ECKERT: And just one other thing, Senator, and I hope you'll be sympathetic 
with this. But the imposition of criminal penalties to me is so unduly harsh. I mean, 
I'm really taking my public service job seriously. I'm you know, and it's a high 
honor and a privilege. But it is really harsh to be thinking that, you know, you're 
facing a criminal penalty for -- that's written into this. It has a very chilling 
effect on communications, and I just don't think that in the legislative aspect of what 
we do that it's fair to us to do that, so ••• 
SENATOR ROBERTI: We'll look into that. 
MR. DAY: The last thing I might add if I could is with regard to the calculation 
of how many appeals there would be. I think it is an important point. Mr. MacBride 
noted his calculation, but he never totaled it up. And our calculation of his total 
would be over 100 appeals heard by the Court every year versus the four or five 
currently heard. Our estimate is if there were an automatic right of appeal, that at 
least half the aggrieved litigants would take them up, and we'd be looking at 200 to 
300 appeals heard all the way through each year, which is, you know, a vast, vast 
increase in litigation. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There's no question that would be out of -- I, you know, 
something -- the Legislature -- I deal with the Air Resources Board, the California 
Energy Commission, the Department of Health Services, other state agencies and 
commissions that make billion-dollar decisions affecting California industry, including 
utilities. And their decisions are received at a lower court, not the Supreme Court. 
And there have not been that many cases. 
MR. DAY: They're discretionary reviews, I believe. Are they not? The vast 
majority of the other agencies that we surveyed are all discretionary review, not 
mandatory. 
MS. ECKERT: This is different. 
MR. DAY: This is a big, big change ••• 
MS. ECKERT: Very different. 
MR. DAY: ••• and it's the same thing that's put FERC in the waste basket for six 
years. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, you would support discretionary review by a court? 
MR. DAY: I would not support any change in the present procedure, but the 
automatic appeal is much, much worse, which is how it's written now. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You're talking bills and not issues, and that's different. 
How does one get an issue looked at if the court won't take it? 
-24-
MR. DAY: Our position is ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm not talking about the winners and losers, I'm talking 
about policy. 
MR. DAY: I understand that. We think you're getting the same amount of 
opportunity for review as other state agencies at the present. And if the statutory 
scheme is balanced in favor of quick decisions by the court, one way or another, to 
provide certainty in the regulatory process, and that overweighs the concept that 
everybody should get a chance to go to the court in every single case. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How many states have another system that goes only to the 
supreme court in their state? Can you tell me? 
MR. DAY: I believe there are several. There were several back when Thelen did his 
study, but I do not know the numbers. We can provide that information to you. 
MS. ECKERT: (Inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah, I wish you would ••• 
MR. DAY: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: ••• because it's my opinion that there aren't very many, and 
there aren't very many for a reason. The supreme courts are not the court that ought 
to be deciding those particular kinds of issues. And I'm not talking about the winners 
and losers. I'm talking about policy which changes as a result of going from monopoly 
system to a deregulatory system in which we are supposed to be creating competition. 
But it's kind of interesting that the kind of -- that the people that we have created 
to create the competition are the ones who are saying, it might just as well have been 
a monopoly. 
MR. DAY: Well, you aren't hearing from all the competitors, and I think that's an 
important concept to remember as well. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. I'm prepared to have another hearing, and you name the 
people who ought to be that we didn't select and I'll be willing to listen to them. It 
just seems to me that what may have been -- and I'm not suggesting that certain things 
are not good for long periods of time, but going from a monopoly system to a different 
kind of a system in the last eight or 10 years, basically, means that something needs 
to be changed in order to release the pressure that begins to build up in these various 
kinds of decisions. 
And so anything further that you would like to ••• ? 
MS. ECKERT: No, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any comment ? 
SENATOR ROBERTI: No, except on the SB 1041. Just to reiterate the point that 
Senator Rosenthal is making, is that the Supreme Court is so inundated with court 
cases, death penalty cases occupying the Court's time to an inordinate degree. There's 
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just no judicial review without .•• 
MR. DAY: The one thing I might ••• 
SENATOR ROBERTI: ••• without appellate. That's why I was persuaded to put the bill 
in. 
MR. DAY: I understand your concern, but I would say if you look at the records 
over a number of years -- and we can provide them the Court isn't taking any leas 
cases than it did before there were the mandatory death penalty appeals. 
MS. ECKERT: Also ••• 
MR. DAY: It's not a significant, to our view and our discussions with the Judicial 
Council's people. They're not relying on the workload issue anymore. 
MS. ECKERT: No. In fact they basically unburdened themself of the biggest 
problem. Those were lawyers that were being disbarred. And there's now been a whole 
new appeal court, State Bar court set up to handle those. And the PUC issue got put in 
with the number of lawyers case, disbarment cases that they were having to hear. And 
now that that's out of the way we're not hearing any of those kinds of complaints from 
the Court any more. And I think they do a really fine job on the ones that they do 
review. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did I hear a witness -- maybe I misunderstood -- indicate that 
there was a case that the Court decided, but you haven't been following it? In 19 ••• 
MR. DAY: No, that was a representation about the CTA case and the definition of --
or rather, the interpretation of Section 1708 on petitions for modifications. And we 
would strenuously object to the notion that we do not comply with that statute. We do. 
They have a different interpretation about what procedures that statute requires, but 
we believe we're following the Court's decision. 
MS. ECKERT: And also, with respect to Mr. DiVirgilio's comment about the pricing 
of gas, I think that that is -- again, it's an interpretation, and if they don't get 
the price that they want then they figure, well, there's something, you know, there's 
something wrong. We'll go around and we'll show them how it's done and we'll take that 
tack if they don't get what they want. So again, you've got more of that winners and 
losers. And the losers now have more money than they used to have, apparently, because 
they really -- you know, they put as many lawyers behind this as the winners do. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. DAY: Thank you. 
MS. ECKERT: Thank you for the chance to testify. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Panel III: Pacific Gas and Electric, GTE, Pacific Bell, and 
Southern Cal Edison. Okay, I didn't have the names of the people who were going to 
represent -- oh, I'm sorry. Okay. Roger Peters; Chief Counsel for Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company. 
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MR. ROGER PETERS: Thank you. My comments will be reasonably brief. I guess 
responding to your request for a conceptual approach, I'm struck by the fact that the 
reference today has been to the fact that the utility industry is moving towards less 
regulation, deregulation, affecting competition. And yet the three proposals for a new 
review process, for an ~ parte rule and ALJ independence, seems to be to translate 
into greater judicial review, limiting the flow of information to decision makers at 
the Commission who are making the decisions on the direction, and putting control of 
the decisions -- at least certain decisions in the ALJs. Seems to me that there is 
a wide mismatch between the direction in which the Utility Commission needs to go and 
where these particular three components are going. 
That raises, I think to me, the question of what the process here. Is it a 
judicial process or is it a legislative process? Commissioner Eckert mentioned the 
Camp Meeker case in which the Court clearly said, this is a legislative model. 
What's a legislative model? Many of the cases that the Commission deals with are 
cases which are not adjudicating past rights. They are adjudicating or they are 
discussing the future. They are forecasting where the price of energy is going to go, 
where rates should go. That is clearly a legislative process. That is not a process 
in which you want to use a judicial model which puts the blinders on, looks at the 
facts as stated historically, and adjudicates the rights of individuals based on those 
facts. That's the wrong model for where this industry is going. This industry needs 
to open up its blinders, look at the future, try to project what's happening, and have 
a Commission with full information make decisions on what is in the best interest of 
the ratepayers and the utilities in this state. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How does FERC affect you in that respect? 
MR. PETERS: The same situation; that is, there is an ~ parte rule at FERC, but I 
believe FERC is having some problems with that ~ parte rule in terms of legislative 
or in terms of judicial review ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What are the problems that they're having? 
MR. PETERS: Well, as I understand it, on the next decision conference FERC is 
considering modifications to its ex parte rule in part because the fact that the 
administration -- particularly the President, President Bush -- is concerned about his 
ability to communicate to FERC on matters of importance to FERC. So we're dealing 
again with a situation ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Wait, wait. They're going to change their rules because they 
want the President to influence their decisions on something? Is that what you're 
talking about? 
MR. PETERS: I can't presume what they're doing. I understand that that is an 
agenda item. And there is a question as to whether or not the legislator (?) or the 
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executive branch should have the ability to communicate with decision makes on matters 
of policy. I believe the courts generally have felt that there should be that ability 
to communicate. So I think to the extent that FERC is looking at those models, maybe 
they're facing some of the problems that we're trying to avoid which might be created 
if these bills were enacted. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Utilities have to deal with ~ parte all over this country in 
their PUC's or their energy commissions or -- I'm trying to figure out why we are 
something special in California in this respect. If all the other states have some 
sort of an ~ parte in law, what -- how do they deal with it? 
MR. PETERS: Well, I don't believe all the states have~ parte rules in law. And 
to the extent that they have ~ parte rules, at least I suspect that they are more 
broadly the sunshine rule that Commissioner Eckert referred to. That is, they allow 
communication to occur, but they allow equal access to communication. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah. 
MR. PETERS: This particular bill does not allow communication to occur. It closes 
communication down entirely. It shuts it off. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't want to talk to these bills. I want to talk about a 
concept of what makes sense. If you're saying, for example, we need sunshine, and I 
heard the President indicate the concept, what's wrong with putting that into law? 
MR. PETERS: Well, I think this bill doesn't put sunshine in law. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How do you utilities deal in Florida where they just have a 
very strict ~ parte just put in? 
MR. PETERS: I don't know. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Think they're going out of business? 
MR. PETERS: I hope they're not. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So do I. 
MR. PETERS: All I can say I mean, getting back to the approach, if their ~ 
parte rules operate in the way this legislation would, I suspect that they're going to 
have problems; not only the utilities, but other parties who wish to change the 
structure, who believe that something else ought to happen that's not happening. I 
mean, ~ parte does open access for both individuals. 
In terms of the scope of review, I guess I would just like to comment. There's 
been some reference that there aren't major cases considered by the California Supreme 
Court. I beg to differ. P.G.& E. has a very large nuclear power plant that the 
Supreme Court heard a case and issued a decision on the interim ratemaking that was 
authorized. That was a billion or multi-billion dollar case to us. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: When was that? 
MR. PETERS: That was in, I believe 1987 or 1988. That was on the interim 
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ratemaking. That case was heard by the Commission. 
Similarly, the Commission did issue its decision on the settlement, Diablo Canyon. 
We believe that was a good settlement. It puts us at risk if that plant doesn't 
operate. And that particular settlement, parties briefed that to the California 
Supreme Court, that they felt that the procedures there were appropriate. It's not 
that the Court ignored it. The Court looked at the briefs of both parties and they 
decided that there wasn't an issue that was meritorious for consideration. I don't 
believe it's fair to make the leap in judgment that that was no review. So I think the 
standard review is different than it has been represented here. 
In terms of what happens if you change it, there's nothing to lose. You appeal 
everything. Appeal as a matter of right. That's not a situation that I think enhances 
the policy of this state. The references as to the number of cases -- I suspect 200, 
300 -- that's probably a good estimate. Certainly there's nothing to lose if you do 
it. 
Just make a couple of other comments. In terms of gx parte, as I said, I believe 
that you need to open communication. Most of the rules, at least a concern that we 
would have as to any rule or any statute, would be that it applies to all parties 
either way in all directions. 
Finally, as to ALJs: Again, I guess I close on a note of irony. It seems to me 
that in a discussion as to whether or not there should be greater judicial review, to 
enact legislation that says absolutely whatever the finding of fact of an ALJ is shall 
not be reviewed by the Commission, if it's not reviewed by the Commission it's hard to 
believe it would be reviewed by the Court. That seems to me to go in the opposite 
direction. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me just ask you something, because ••• 
MR. PETERS: Excuse me. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm sorry. 
MR. PETERS: There is one other point I wanted to make. You referenced the 
California Energy Commission. I would just draw your attention to the fact that Public 
Resources Code Section 25531 provides that judicial review of a licensing matter or 
certification of a utility power plant is directly to the California Supreme Court, the 
exact same rules as the Public Utilities Commission appeal. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: One of the things that we hear about, and it's kind of an 
interesting expression, and I'd like to know if somebody has some comment. There's the 
concept of the fifth-floor decision, or the fifth-floor approach. Tell me what that's 
about. Have you heard that? Has anybody heard that? 
MR. PETERS: Well, all decisions are made on the fifth floor. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Oh, okay. Okay. Not on one-on-one basis? 
MR. PETERS: Pardon me? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Is that where somebody can walk up to the ••• 
MR. PETERS: I believe decisions made on the fifth floor and announced in the 
Commission -- in the open Commission's decision conference based on any discussion at 
that point. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, thank you very much. Let's see: Bruce Jamison. 
MR. BRUCE JAMISON: Senator, I have some prepared remarks. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Fine. 
MR. JAMISON: Senator Rosenthal, Senator Roberti, my name is Bruce Jamison, 
representing Pacific Bell. Many of the parties who have spoken so far have taken 
positions which are similar to Pacific's, and I won't repeat what they have said in a 
very eloquent way. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: This will make part of -- so if you'll just kind of tell us. 
MR. JAMISON: With the exception of ~ parte, Pacific is opposed to the positions 
that are outlined in the bills as they are written. And in the case of ~ parte we 
oppose it as well, but we are certainly in favor of ~ parte rules. we have been on 
record publicly to that regard in the past in hearings before your committee 
December of 1989, I believe. 
But I concur with President Eckert and with the preceding speaker that the ~ parte 
rules as described in your bill are draconian in nature and would close off 
communication rather than provide sunshine, particularly when we deal with a 
~~asi-legislative type process at the PUC. Disclosure is certainly a welcome item, but 
cutting off communication is not welcome. 
As to the issue of appeal, the issue of trial de DQYQ as spoken to earlier is of 
grave concern to Pacific, and I would second the comments that have been made by 
previous speakers to that regard. 
And finally on the ALJ issue, the issue of whether or not ALJ decisions have an 
opportunity to be commented on by the public seems to have been overlooked, although 
Mr. Day pointed that out very clearly. There are very specific comment cycles outlined 
in the Commission's own rules in which -- under which if a party feels that there has 
been an error in the proposed decision, that is the opportunity to bring it to the 
attention to the Commission. And the Commission does not vote on the decision until 
after those comments are in. 
With those in mind, noting the hour, I think that it's been said well by others. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Ken Okel. 
MR. KEN OKEL: Yes, Mr. Chairman, my name is Ken Okel and I'm ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'm sorry about the pronunciation. 
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MR. OKEL: It's common. I'm Associate General Counsel for GTE California. 
A lot of our concerns, I think, were very well summarized by Commissioner Eckert in 
her presentation. I would like to perhaps -- you were asking for some information 
about perhaps ~ parte laws in other states, and I can speak only of one state in which 
other than California in which I've been involved in a case, and that's the State of 
washington which has a rule which says basically that all the commissioners must 
attend. They have an ~ parte contact rule, but offsetting that is a rule which 
requires all the commissioners to attend every hearing in every case that's before it; 
or if they don't attend a hearing they are required by statute to read the transcript 
of that hearing each day. Given the incredible number of matters that are before this 
Commission, I think that type of rule would be unfeasible in California. 
And I think, given the length of the proceedings, the complexity of the 
proceedings, there is a need to have some communication between the utilities and the 
commissioners and other people to talk to commissioners. And I think the -- we support 
some sort of~ parte rule, and I think what's going to take place before the 
Commission is a good idea. 
You are suggesting that these type of rules properly belong in statutes so some 
later Commission doesn't change the rule. I would suggest that type of rigidity is not 
really particularly useful in the long-term situation. I think you need some 
flexibility to allow rules to adapt; as new information comes to the Commission's 
attention, it can be incorporated in the rules. If there is a rule in effect, 
obviously, that rule would be available for inspection by the Legislature. You would 
have some -- as part of perhaps your oversight role to just see what's going on, and 
you would know and could ask questions should they -- concerns arise. 
Getting back to the appellate review bill, we are like the other parties who 
have been opposing this legislation, are quite concerned with the impact this might 
have on getting cases decided which are quasi-legislative in nature. And that's really 
the application proceedings, the investigations, and this type of proceeding. From our 
own experience, we have cases that go -- and our last, when we were in the rate case 
mode, we have 95 days of hearings in a 1988 rate case which still hasn't been finished. 
We had 61 days of hearings in this new regulatory framework investigation. 
so I think one thing you should keep in mind in this legislation is to realize that 
California in many ways is very different from other states. I don't think there's any 
state in this country that has so much up-front openness in its PUC-type proceedings in 
terms of receiving and developing a very extensive and exhaustive evidentiary record. 
From talking to my counterparts who work in other states, a rate case can be decided in 
two weeks in other states. In California that's that would be unheard of. There's 
just a lot of input that the Commission receives in carrying out its quasi-legislative 
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functions. So when you get down to the time a decision is made, you have a very, very 
full and complete record. 
So our concern is if you go through this lengthy process, you have a year of 
hearings, and then you go ahead and have additional years of appellate review of an 
automatic right of appeal, and then people challenging that and going to the Supreme 
court, you'll never get things resolved. You're going to have cases that are pending 
for years and years and years, and I think that is not in the public interest. You got 
to close -- get closure at some earliest possible point. I think Commission Eckert 
stated the process going directly to the Court is an excellent way to Supreme 
Court -- is the excellent way to do that. 
We were concerned about one provision of the bill concerning the standards for 
judicial review and quasi-legislative proceedings. It seems to me the way the bill is 
currently written that you have a substantial evidence test to justify any action made 
by the Commission. That is far different from the standard that the courts have used 
in California consistently regarding review of quasi-administrative type decisions. 
The standard there has always been whether the courts -- the decision of the agency is 
arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support. 
And I just cite you the case of Pitts vs. Perless at 58 Cal 2nd, Page A-24. And 
that's discussed at page A-33. And this doctrine has been around for many years. 
There's no -- for quasi-legislative decisions you don t have a substantial evidence 
test. 
And think it was interesting, just going back to Panel I's comments: It's from the 
comments that were made there, the concerns that were expressed by some groups (?), and 
I'll use TURN in particular about certain Commission action, in that in effect what 
they're asking that they want the courts to do is to be a quasi -- or super Commission 
to review the policy decisions adopted by the Commission. She used examples of the new 
regulatory framework case, the rate of return earned by AT&T, and some other 
proceedings; the P.G.& E. settlement agreement. 
They're asking for the --what they're looking for the courts to do is becoming a 
body to challenge the policy determinations made by the Commission and to second guess 
the Commission, if you will, not necessarily from a legal point of view to decide if 
those policies are good for the State of California. And I submit the California 
Commission as a constitutional agency is the body who should be making those decisions. 
The courts should be looking at decisions if at all from the point of view of a 
leg(al) -- whether they've followed, they've met the legal requirements that apply. 
In the case of -- there's standards where they look at the evidence independently, 
if constitutional rights are involved. And if they're not constitutional rights, then 
you have to look at the arbitrary, capricious nature of decisions, a very limited type 
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of review in those type of quasi-legislative type decisions. 
Again, I think those really are the substance of our comments. Again, I think we 
generally -- are in general agreement with, I thought, the very carefully thought out 
comments of commission Eckert and Mr. Day and the views expressed by some of the other 
panelists on this Panel III. Thank you. 
MR. JAMES LEHRER: Thank you, Chairman Rosenthal. In view of the time I will try 
and trim my prepared marks down as much as I can, as well. There are a few remarks 
that were made earlier that I would like to respond to if I may. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Fine. Okay. If you have written testimony we'll accept that 
as part of the record. 
MR. LEHRER: Well, I would like to work into it ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Fine. Okay. 
MR. LEHRER: ••• my response to some of the earlier comments I heard, if I may. 
Edison appreciates the opportunity to comment on Senate Bills 1041 and 1042. We 
oppose both of those bills because we believe they would impair the commission's 
ability to render timely and informed decisions. We see no benefits to the regulatory 
process that would offset the detriments that the bill would cause. 
Let me first note a few comments with respect to SB 1041. It would not -- and it's 
been said before, but it bears reiterating -- relieve the Supreme Court's workload. 
Quite the contrary, it would increase the workload of the state's appellate system in 
general, including that of the Supreme Court, because once a party has filed a petition 
with a lower court of appeal it's a simple matter if they get a decision that's 
unsatisfactory to slap a new cover on it and try it before the Supreme Court. It 
doesn't cost that much more in terms of dollars and lawyer input. But it certainly 
would cost that much more in terms of time to the parties who are looking for finality 
to the decision. 
In the meantime, the final resolution of ratemaking decision involving hundreds of 
millions of dollars and major policy determinations of the Commission would be delayed. 
And the state's statistics indicate that just on appeal to the Court of Appeal, those 
delays would be on average 18 months. Major utilities have general rate cases every 
three years; cost of capital adjustment every year; fuel clause proceedings in the case 
of energy utilities every year. And appeals of right to the Court of Appeal causing 
delays on the order of 18 months each could cause three of these cases, for example, to 
stack up so that you could have an amount in jeopardy of, in Edison's case, an amount 
equal to Edison's total annual earnings -- $700 million. You stack up a general rate 
case, a fuel clause proceeding, and a cost of capital proceeding, you could easily get 
that much money in jeopardy. 
Now, just to put that in perspective, you and I would be hard pressed to plan for 
-33-
the future if we new that our whole annual income was going to be suspended or put in 
jeopardy. Similarly, utilities• ability to plan is to be severely hampered by 
the imposition of that kind of delay and uncertainty. And this Legislature recognized 
that in 1911, and the need for prompt and effective 
than it was back in 1911. 
is no less important 
I'd like to turn to SB 1042 for a moment. It seems to be that the thought behind 
that bill loses sight of the fact that the Commission, not the ALJ, has the duty and 
authority to set policy and to make decisions and findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. It would make the ALJs a driving force in setting policy, and it would 
substantially diminish the Commission's role in establishing policy. 
As far as the ~ parte communications between commissioners and the ALJ until the 
draft decision has been issued, that bill again confuses ALJs with civil judges. The 
ALJs are not members of the judiciary. They're merely hearing officers. They are 
accountable to the Commission. The public interest would not be served by barring 
communication between the ALJs who must implement the Commission's policy, and the 
commissioners who must set that policy. 
The~ parte rule that's proposed in sa 1042 would make members of the Commission 
less accessible. The intent of the ~ parte rule may be to improve the regulatory 
process, but we don't believe it would accomplish that objective. Openness and 
accessibility are essential for effective I'm sure that the legislators 
recognize the importance of talking directly with their constituents and finding out 
what s on their minds without the filter of an institutionalized, legalized process. 
Of equal importance to the Commission is a direct understanding of the concerns of 
their constituents and of the many complex issues which they must consider in 
establishing the state's energy policies. The Commission is not and should not be a 
court. Just as legislators here reach out in an effort to understand the issues before 
them and to craft informed solutions, the Commission should be allowed the same 
flexibility in the conduct of their legislative -- quasi-legislative functions. 
In addition, we see the institution of an ~ parte rule as a step in the direction 
of increased formality and heightened barriers to communication at a time when the 
Commission is working very hard to be a more open, accessible forum for the average 
person to participate in. We think they've been successful in the past two years in 
that, and we think that Section 1042, particularly with its criminal sanctions, 
sends the wrong signal. 
In conclusion, we think that these bills would detract from rather than contribute 
to the effectiveness of utility regulation. And finally I would note that of the six 
concerns that are identified in the package that was distributed prior to this 
informational hearing, three are not even addressed. We met with members of the 
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legislative staff to discuss those, and I participated in the sort of the kick-off 
meeting, if you will, where we heard some of the original concerns expressed by the new 
competitive players. And the concerns that they seem to have, including the conduct of 
workshops and the timing of Commission proceedings, are things that perhaps could be 
more fruitfully explored in Commission rule makings than the imposition of these rules, 
which we don't believe would really address the kinds of concerns that the parties have 
expressed. 
In addition ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you sum up, because you're repeating some of the same 
things that have already been 
MR. LEHRER: Yes sir. I'm almost done. I'd like to point out that Mr. MacBride 
called for, to quote, decisions of the Commission explaining why the Commission was 
correct in all respects, unquote -- if my notes captured his words correctly. And I 
think that it's very clear that what he is representing here is a judicial model of 
regulation, and I agree completely with Mr. Peters' comments that that is quite 
inappropriate to the task the Commission has before it. And it's not surprising to me 
that a private attorney would be more interested in a judicial model and take their 
chances with the courts than relying on the expertise of the Commission. 
Similarly, I would note that Ms. Krause also clearly, explicitly stated that she 
wanted the courts to review the merits of CPUC decisions. So if you're talking about 
reviewing the Commission process, I think you're not in sync with what some of the 
other parties here are suggesting. They want the Commission decisions reviewed on 
their merits. So let's make no mistake about it. The number of appeals and the extent 
of the appeals would be very, very great. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: My concern is not the winners and losers. I've expressed that 
many times. I'm concerned about the process. And I must say that it would be 
difficult, in my opinion, for a utility to take the PUC to task for anything they did 
in terms of the process. And I understand that. 
At the same time, hearing from all of the others, those who were here and those who 
were not here, indicate that there is some kind of a problem. And maybe -- it kind of 
disturbs me that because there's a bill we now have sunshine, whatever that means. And 
I have no problem with sunshine. But if the bill goes away, does the sunshine go away? 
See, I don't know the answers, really. And because of the number of groups that have 
been concerned about the process is the reason that I'm even interested in the subject 
matter at all. 
I have to tell you that there are no secrets around Sacramento, okay. And when 
something happens, it spreads pretty quickly. And we hear about them, and what I'm 
trying to get to at some point is how we put out the smoke that's all over the place in 
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terms of the process. When somebody says, you know, you've got -- I need a decision by 
this date, and that may be difficult for anybody, then I wonder, you know, why that's 
done. And I'm not suggesting that there isn't enough that you shouldn't have enough 
time to make your case or whatever it happens to be. But almost no one can compete 
with a 
saying. 
that doesn't want to give up something, if you understand what I'm 
MR. LEHRER: I do, Senator, but maybe I've been in the trenches too much these past 
10 years, but I've got the scars all over me to show me ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand. 
MR. LEHRER: ••• that there's a great deal of-- a great deal of advocacy and give 
and take. The utilities are not always the winners by any stretch. And we're as 
committed to having an effective PUC process as anyone. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I am too. And if in fact these hearings --and we'll probably 
have some more -- if they push us in the direction of the process being cleaned up so 
that people feel they've gotten a fair shake, then I'm really not concerned about 
somebody who lost something. But if somebody lost something because they didn't have 
enough time to present their case or because their attorney had to work on Saturday and 
somebody else's had more attorneys that could fill in for somebody who didn't want to 
work Saturdays, then those are the things I become concerned about. 
Anyway, I thank you very much. 
MR. LEHRER: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We now have ••• 
MR. JAMISON: Senator, I'd like to add one comment here. In my discussion of the 
issues here I talked about ~ parte. I think we've seen a display on the part of the 
Commission of a willingness to undertake a review of those rules, and we ought to let 
that process work; let them work out those ~ parte rules. The issue may have been 
raised here in the past, but certainly this Commission is moving in that direction. 
And again, Pacific supports that move. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I am pleased that they are moving in that direction, and I 
want to thank the President for that movement. It seems to me that once she or they 
decide what it ought to be, then we ought to have some law which says, that's what 
you've got to do. 
MR. JAMISON: Well, I think ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'll tell you something. Otherwise, it changes. It will 
change every time there's a new Commission or a new president, and that's not what 
ought to happen. If it's good then it's good. And if it's not good it's not good. If 
it doesn't work we'll change the law. We do that all the time. 
, I want to thank the participants. we now have an open microphone available 
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for short comments. Nobody's going to read a long statement. If anybody in the 
audience would like to come up and make a one-minute comment about anything, you have 
the ability now to do that. Just identify yourself and in one brief statement tell us 
what you think. 
MR. DAN BAKER: My name is Dan Baker, and I represent the Ad Hoc Carriers 
Committee. And I probably ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The Ad Hoc what? 
MR. D. BAKER: Ad Hoc Carriers Committee. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Carriers Committee. Okay. 
MR. D. BAKER: And we participated in all the major PUC general freight rate cases. 
In fact the Commission in 1986 adopted our program for the regulation of all general 
freight rates in California. I have experience before all courts in the United States, 
appealing from regulatory commission decisions. I have had no trouble whatsoever going 
to the U.S. District Court, three judge court; I've gone to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, United States Supreme Court. We do not have any problems. But we do have 
problems with the procedure of the California PUC. 
You asked for a specific example. We had 58 days of hearings in the last general 
freight case. You could look at that decision and you'll find -- very pressed to find 
any reference to the factual information that's presented in that proceeding. However, 
eight months after the case was closed you'll find the key element: the variable cost 
price floor, or minute rate. It was not mentioned. It was not discussed. It was not 
introduced in that proceeding, but that most important element of the whole decision 
came up eight months after the case was submitted. 
Not only that, but you had -- under the Commissions' regulations you're supposed to 
have findings of facts and conclusion. On this important element there were no 
findings of facts and conclusion because there was no discussion of the matter. The 
statutory provision •.• (TAPE TURNED OVER) ••• to the public and to the Commission with 
regarding to filing common carrier rates and tariffs. The Commission changed that to 
10 days. And there're other elements to that decision. I appealed a case, and I've 
people say they got one. I got three votes, but close is only good in horse racing, 
nothing else. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Horse shoes. 
MR. D. BAKER: Now, with regard to the fear of these rate cases, I was going to 
bring an article that was in the paper about six months ago when the Commission bragged 
that there were no major rate cases considered in 1990. And the reason for that is 
they set up formulas that are voiding their duties to set rates. The rates are not set 
by the Commission any more. They're set by the utilities, by the carriers. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
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MR. D. BAKER: One last statement. With regard to the Commission's proposed rules 
of ~ ~: Look at them. They are not ~ parte rules that are going to curb 
anything because it eliminates the rules case. It eliminates the investigation cases, 
the most important cases that the Commission considers. 
Furthermore, the ex parte rule is only triggered after the case is submitted. It 
can go on for a year or six months, and all during that time the matter is wide open 
for ~ parte communications. And only when it's submitted does it become effective. 
If there's going to be an~ parte rule it's going to have to come from the 
Legislature, not the Commission. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. I think that that's one of the things we ought to look 
into and question. As a matter of fact, I'd like to get an answer form the President. 
I wish they had stayed around so the PUC could have heard these comments. 
Be interesting to take a look at what that ~ parte -- what it doesn't do. 
MR. D. BAKER: Your honor, it's rather simple. Look in the first paragraph, about 
four lines, and you'll come to the same conclusion. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. I thank you very much for that comment. Yes sir. 
MR. STEVE BAKER: Mr. Chairman, Steve Baker with Aaron Read and Associates 
representing the Association of California State Attorneys and Administrative Law 
Judges. We represent the administrative law judges that work at the PUC, and would 
like to indicate our support for both SB 1041 and 1042. We also appreciate your 
ongoing efforts to provide some reform at the PUC, and we look forward to working with 
both you and Senator Roberti on the successful passage of these measures. 
Thanks again. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Anybody else? Quickly -- one minute? 
Thank you very much for coming, and we'll be continuing with the hearings at some 
point. 
--ooOoo--
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COMMENTS OF TOWARD UTILITY RATE NORMALIZATION 
ON SENATE BILLS 1041 AND 1042 
April 9, 1991 
Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), the only 
statewide residential consumer group that regularly 
participates in proceedings before the California Public 
Utilities Commission (CPUC), strongly endorses the basic 
thrust of Senate Bills (SB) 1041 and 1042. We support SB 
1041 essentially as is, and could support SB 1042 if it were 
amended to address certain concerns noted in our written 
comments, which we are submitting today. 
The need for comprehensive procedural reform at the 
CPUC has never been greater. While process-related problems 
have been most severe in the telecommunications and 
transportation industries, similar concerns are arising with 
increasing frequency in the energy area as well. The 
seriousness of the situation is compounded by the virtual 
absence of any real judicial review. 
In TURN's view, the single most important aspect of the 
bills before you is the provision for Court of Appeal review 
of PUC decisions. This element is crucial, because the 
existence of an effective review mechanism will go a long 
way toward restoring the Commission's own sense of self-
discipline. With virtually no significant court review over 
the last decade, the Commission has been able to "get away 
with" poorly reasoned and procedurally defective decisions. 
The mere presence of an effective review mechanism will 
deter this disturbing trend toward arbitrary, and sometimes 
even sloppy, decisionmaking. Of all the potential changes 
that the Legislature could enact, this one clearly offers 
the greatest "bang for the buck. 11 
The Supreme Court's reluctance to review more than a 
handful of CPUC decisions over the last decade, while 
perhaps understandable in light of the Court's workload, has 
nonetheless been extremely frustrating to parties such as 
TURN who have sought to appeal major Commission decisions 
with broad public impact. Some of our unsuccessful attempts 
to obtain Supreme Court review have included challenges to 
CPUC decisions that: 
1) Approved a contested settlement of the Diablo Canyon 
nuclear powerplant reasonableness review and adopted a price 
formula for Diablo generation that has resulted in 
substantial rate increases for customers and record profits 
for the utility; 
2) Discarded almost a century of ratemaking precedent 
by approving a "new regulatory framework" for local 
telephone companies that relies on arbitrary formulas rather 
than detailed review of utility costs to set rates; 
3) Approved a contested settlement of the Palo Verde 
nuclear plant prudency review, which tied Edison's cost 
recovery for that plant to the CPUC's decision on the 
2 
reasonableness of the costs of a different nuclear plant in 
a different state; and 
4) Granted AT&T the right to increase its long-distance 
telephone rates without a hearing, despite the fact 
that company is still the clear price leader in the only 
partially competitive residential long-distance market. 
Under SB 1041, TURN would gain at least the opportunity 
to have its arguments on such major issues considered on 
their merits by the Court of Appeal. Today, parties who 
take the gamble of seeking judicial review can only wait to 
receive the seemingly .inevitable postcard denial in the mail 
from the Supreme Court. 
I should point out here that TURN has only recently 
come to the conclusion that intermediate appellate review is 
necessary. While proposals such as this one have surfaced 
from time to time over the years, TURN previously withheld 
its support out of concern that the review process would be 
dominated by the utilities and others with the "deep 
pockets" needed to hire an additional staff of appellate 
lawyers. Obviously, small non-profits such as TURN do not 
enjoy that luxury. Nonetheless, we have now become 
convinced that the problems at the CPUC are so severe that 
effective judicial review is the only workable solution. 
SB 1041 would also establish a requirement that CPUC 
decisions be supported by substantial evidence in the record 
3 
of the proceeding. Under the current "any shred of 
evidence" rule, TURN's lawyers have frequently concluded 
that even poorly reasoned or arbitrary Commission decisions 
are not worth appealing, because the standard of court 
review is so narrow. Effectively, Commission decisions can 
now be challenged only if they violate a specific statute or 
result from procedural errors. Given the general nature of 
most provisions in the current Public Utilities Code, even 
the most illogical or capricious decision may therefore 
escape judicial review altogether. A "substantial evidence" 
test would go a long way toward insuring that the Commission 
is more careful and thoughtful in its decisionmaking. 
By way of comparison, it is not at all uncommon today 
for the federal appellate courts to remand orders issued by 
administrative agencies such as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) on the grounds that the 
agency's reasoning does not support the ordered result. 
such decisions often do not overturn the agency's 
conclusions at all-- they simply require an understandable 
logical explanation of the thought process by which those 
conclusions were reached. As minimal as this degree of 
court oversight may seem, it would be nothing short of 
revolutionary if a CPUC decision were overturned on this 
basis. Today's appellate review process in California does 
not require that the Commission use logical reasoning based 
on record evidence, but TURN believes that it should. 
4 
TURN therefore applauds Senator Roberti for introducing 
SB 1041 and strongly urges all members of the committee to 
approve this "good government" legislation. 
PROPOSED LANGUAGE CHANGES 
SB 1041 
Section 1756: At page 4, line 7, the word "agreeing" 
should read "aggrieved." 
Subsection (c), lines 22-28. This subsection is 
supposed to establish that the "date of issuance" is the 
date when the Commission actually mails its decision, which 
is often several days after the date of the Commission 
meeting. The proposed new language is confusing and unclear 
however. TURN prefers the existing language that is already 
included as the last sentence of Section 1756. 
Section 1756.1: This new section is superflous, because 
the same provision is included in Section 1758(a). 
SB 1042 
Section 3 (page 3). This section of the bill would 
split the current Section 1705 into five subsections and 
make certain changes. We will address each of the new 
subsections in turn. 
5 
Subsection (a} simply carries over what are now the 
first two sentences of Section 1705, with only minor 
editorial changes. TURN suggests a further modification, to 
remove any implication that the requirements of this section 
apply only in complaint cases. There is no apparent reason 
for such a limitation, and no such distinction exists in 
current PUC practice. 
(a) At the time fixed for any hearing before 
the commission or a commissioner, or the time to 
which the hearing has been continued, [the 
complainant and the corporation or person 
complained of, and such corporations or persons as 
the commission allows to intervene] all parties to 
the proceeding, [shall be] are entitled to be 
heard and to introduce evidence. The commission 
shall issue process to enforce the attendance of 
all necessary witnesses. 
By changing the language from complainant, etc. to all 
parties, it becomes clear that the section applies to all 
hearings before the Commission, not just hearings in 
complaint cases. 
Subsection (b) would require that the ALJ's decision be 
based on the record of the proceeding. TURN agrees. 
Subsection (c) would state that the Commission is bound 
by the factual findings of the ALJ and would further require 
the Commission to explain, with reference to the record, the 
reasons for any substantial changes it makes to the ALJ's 
proposed decision. TURN sees no good reason why the 
Commission should be bound by the ALJ's factual findings. 
on the other hand, the Commission should be required to 
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explain the reasons for any changes it makes. This 
represents a very minimal burden and will help to assure 
reasoned decisionmaking. TURN therefore recommends that the 
sentence that begins on line 5 and ends on line 6 of page 4 
be stricken from the bill. 
Subsection (d) simply adds a requirement that the 
Commission serve its decision on all parties. This reflects 
current practice. It also corresponds with TURN's comments 
regarding subsection (a) to the extent that it clearly makes 
the language applicable to cases other than complaints. 
Subsection (e) makes no substantive changes to existing law. 
Section 4 (pages 4-7). This section of the bill would 
establish ex parte contact restrictions. TURN would favor a 
disclosure-type ex parte rule, but does not favor an 
outright ban. We also strongly oppose criminal penalties 
[Section 1705.5(d)J. 
TURN agrees that the burden of reporting any contacts 
should be on the Commissioner, because the important thing 
is what the decisionmaker thought he heard, not what the 
communicator thought he said. If the burden is nonetheless 
placed on the outside party, then the notice of ex parte 
contact should be served on all parties, not just hidden 
away in the Commission's files. 
TURN agrees with the proposed Section 1705.5(a) (3), 
regarding the treatment of commissioners' advisors. 
Restrictions on staff personnel should go no farther than 
7 
this. TURN opposes Section 1705.5(b), which would extend 
the ex parte rule to ALJs. There is no real or perceived 
problem with the ALJs and ex parte contacts. Further, the 
penalties are actually more severe than for contacts with 
commissioners, for no apparent reason. Given the fine line 
between prohibited substantive contacts and procedural ones 
(which are often necessary with ALJs) TURN particularly 
opposes the sanctions provision. 
Subsection (c), which defines "adjudicatory 
proceeding," is critical and yet unduly vague, because of 
the reference to "other similar formal action." 
Specifically, the definition would appear to cover most 
commission-initiated investigations (OIIs), which often 
incorporate evidentiary hearings before an ALJ. TURN agrees 
that such investigations should be covered, but the language 
needs to be clear. One reasonable option would be to apply 
the ex parte rule in any proceeding in which an ALJ proposed 
decision will be issued pursuant to Section 311 of the Code 
(basically, all cases that go to hearing). This would also 
then cover the more unusual, but not unheard of, situation 
where hearings are held in a rulemaking proceeding. TURN 
would favor such coverage. 
If the concerns set forth above can be accommodated, 
TURN would support SB. 1042, along with 1041. 
8 
In general, however, TURN supports the need for codifying 
rules regarding ex parte contacts at the Commission. As you 
know, the Commission has proposed its own ex parte rule, and TURN 
has concerns with that propsal as well. Furthermore, while TURN 
would like to believe that the Commission will follow through on 
establishing an ex parte rule, past experience leads us to 
believe that the Commission may not follow through. 
Consequently, we believe a legislative remedy is in order. 
9 

December 19, 1990 
Mr. Paul Fadelli 
Senate Energy & Public Utilities Committee 
State Capitol, Room 2035 
Sacramento, California 95814 
RE: CPUC REFORM BILL 
Dear Paul: 
~ - .... l . ' ,·1 • 
! ~ ; .J {..; . 
4341 PIEDMONT A VENUE 
P.O. BOX 11080 
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94611 
(415) 428-2225 
ALANJ.GARDNER 
rice Presidenr/Regulatory Affairs 
Enclosed is a copy of the opinion in Camp Meeker Water System 
Inc. vs. PUC decided by the California Supreme Court on November 
15, 1990. 
On pages 12976-7, you will see the court has decided and 
discussed the scope of review on the factual basis of a 
Commission decision. This discussion clearly indicates that the 
standard of review now existing in California is not what is 
generally provided in the other 49 states. Rather, the standard 
here is "whether the Commission has regularly pursued its 
authority." 
This means that even if the Legislature's reform bill grants 
appellate review, such review would effectively be precluded. 
The present standard of review means a Commision factual finding 
would be insulated from review even if it was contrary to 
overwhelming factual evidence in the record that would make the 
finding "erroneous" in most of the jurisdictions. 
We are not talking about a situation when there is real 
substantive evidence introduced that is conflicting and upon 
which the Commission then has the full right and duty to make a 
choice or to meld its choice. What we are talking about is where 
testimony is presented without any support or backup: for 
instance in the recent depreciation proceedings, ORA candidly 
admitted it had no studies or backup for its position, and it had 
picked the mid-point between the two disputed figures with no 
other justification. Under that circumstance, other states' 
standards of appellate review would suggest a Commission decision 
based on such "evidence" is "erroneous" and an unsupported 
factual finding. This does not mean the Commission could not 
have chosen between the two principal parties' positions, but it 
Serving Over 5,000,000 California Families 
Mr. Paul Fadelli 
December 19, 1990 
Page two 
does mean that in other states there would have had to be a 
substantive basis for how the factual decision was made, and 
supporting conclusions, if on cross-examination, the direct 
testimony of one of the two parties had been impeached or 
reasonably called into question. 
Therefore, I suggest that as part of the appellate review section 
of the reform bill that the standards for review of factual 
evidence and conclusions be listed. While there are several 
standards the Legislature might want to consider, we suggest the 
"preponderance of the evidence" test is fair to both the 
Commission and any parties who are disappointed in a factual 
finding. 
answer any questions, please give me a call. 
Enclosure 
cc: Spencer R. Kaitz 
Dennis Mangers 
AJG:tmc 
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ployees had no legal nght to retatn Chandler's keys 
(Knighten v. Sam's Parking Valet, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 75-76}, we do agree that this case does not involve a neg-
ligent entrustment. The vehicle drtven by Chandler be-
longed to him, not to Saga or one of its employees. However, 
plaintiff's lack of a cause of actiOn based on negligent en· 
trustment cannot JUStify Saga's summary judgment, given 
the Restatement Second of Torts section 324 A issue pre· 
sented by plaintitrs oppositiOn to the motion for summary 
JUdgment. Thus, Mcttelka is also of no value to Saga. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff has submttted evsdence to raise a triable 
issue ofmatenal fact regardmg whether Saga's restaurant 
and its patron, Chandler, had an arrangement or agree-
ment on the mght of the accident to the effect that the res-
taurant employees would not give Chandler's keys back to 
him if he were under the tntluence of alcohol. If such an ar-
rangement existed, Saga may have liability to plaintiff 
ba!>ed upon the pnnciples expressed in section 324A of the 
Restatement Second of Torts. Therefore, the trial court 
erred Jn awarding Saga a summary Judgment. 
DISPOSITION 
The judgment appealed from \S reversad and the cause 
is remanded to the trial court w1th directions to vacate its 
order granting Saga's motion for summary JUdgment and 
conduct further proceedings In accordance with the views 
expressed herem. Costs on appeal to plaintiff. 
We concur: 
KLEIN,P.J. 
DANIELSON,J. 
CROSKEY,J. 
1 The 1978 amendment to secuon 1714 designated the original 
text ofthat section as subdiVISIOn {a) and added the followmg provi-
SIOnS. 
"(b) lt1s the intent of the Legtslature lO abrogate the holdings in 
cases such as Yesf'ly v. Sager (5 Cal.3d 153). Bernhard v. Harrah's 
Club( 16CaL3a 313). and Coulter v. SupcriorCourl!{2ljCal.3o [144)) 
and to remstate the prior JUdicial interpretation of this section as It 
relates to proximate cause for IOJunes incurred as a result of fur-
nishing alcoholic beverages to an mtox•cated person, namely lhat 
the furn1snmg of alcoholic beverages 1s not the proximate cause of 
mJunes rcsultwg from 1ntox1cation, but rather the consumption of 
olcoholic beverages 1s the proximate cause of injuries inflicted 
upon another by an intOXICated person. 
"(C) No soc1al host who furnishes alcoholic beverages to any 
person shall be held legall:; accountable for damages suffered by 
such perscn, or for InJUry to the person or properly of, or death of, 
any third p.;;r:on, resulting from the consumption of such beverag-
cs ... 
The 1978 amendment to sectior, 25602 designated the origmal 
text ofthatsection as subdiv1s1on {a) and added the followang provi-
Sions. 
"(b) No person who sells, furnsshes. gtves. or causes to be sold. 
furn1shed, or g1ven away. any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdi· 
vis1on !a) ofthi• secuon shall be csvilly liable to any InJured person 
or the estate of such person for mjuries Inflicted on that person as a 
result ofi nl<•xication by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage. 
"(cl The [.eg1sJature hereby declares that th1s setuon shall be 
Interpreted so that the holdings m cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 
Cui 3d 153l, D"rnhard v. llarrah's Club! 16 Cal.3d 313) and Coulter 
v. Superior Court <21 Cal 3ci !44J be abrogated m fao;or ofpnor Jtu.li-
Cial interpretation find mg the consumpt1o11 of a!roholic beverages 
rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages a~ the proximate 
cau~e or 1 njunes 1 nil ictcd upon another by an 1 ntoxscated person." 
2. The record does nol rcllect whether the trial court ruled ou 
the ob)ecuons. However. that IS oi no consequence; we must deter· 
mmc the validtty of those obJCCtiom ourselves smce our standard of 
rcv1cw IS a de novo exammat10n of the order which granted the mo-
tion for summary Judgment. (Pril'c v Wells Fargo Bank (1989) 213 
Cal App 3d 465. 474.) 
3. Such testimony could not be rece1ved m thiS case over a hear· 
say obJection on the ground that It IS admiSSible under the "former 
testimony'' excepuon. Under Evidence Code section 1292, subdivi· 
s1on <al.lt IS requtred that the dcclarant(l.e .. Mr. Nolan) be unavail· 
able as a witness. No such showmg 1s made here. However, inas-
much as the recorded testimony was offered in supportofthe oppo· 
sltion to a summary Judgment motion and 1ervei effectively as 
declaration by Mr. Nolan, we trcatithereauuch. 
4.ltis of no consequence whether the arrangement which pi air 
tiff contends Chandler had with the employees at the restau!'llnt, 
v1ewed as one made gratuitously by the restaurant or one in wluc 
the consideration given by Chandler was his continued busine' 
there. 
5. The duty of a volunteer ends once he had performed his 
untary act IAndrewa v. Wells (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 533, 541.) Thu 
although, according lO Nolan, Saga's employees had previous' 
held Chandler's keys for him, it is not those past acts that bring th· 
case w1th Restatement Second section 324A. Rather, it is plaintiff 
assertion that on the n1ght of the accident, the restaurant em~<lo· 
ees took, apparently in accordance with an understanding or agre• 
ment made with Chandler, and then returned biskeystohim. 
6. The court in Knighten explained that although the valet ser 
vice could have refused lO g1ve the keys back to the driver since ''A 
citizens in California have the right to interfere with an attempt! 
commit a crime. and drunk driving obviously is that [citation]," th 
valet service did not have a to do so. (Knighten v. Sam's Parking 
let, supra, 206 Cai.App.3d at pp. 75-76.) Quoting from another casE 
the court said; "'As a general rule, one owes no duty to control tih 
conduct of another .... · (Davidson v. City or Westminster 0982) 3 
Cal.3d 197,203 .... ) Only a special relationship between the two par 
t1cs, or between the one party and the potential victims of the other 
creates such a duty. {Ibid.)" The Knighten court found no such spE 
cia I relationshiP 1n the case before it. {I d. at pp. 73·'14.) · 
REAL PROPERTY 
Regulated Utility Has Easement 
For Water Resource Development 
Citcas90DailyJournal D.A.R.l2972 
CAMP MEEKER WATER SYSTEM, INC., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 
Respondent; 
CAMP MEEKER RECREATION AND PARK DISTRICT, 
Real Party in Interest. 
No. S012916 
Cali forma Supreme Court 
Filed November 15,1990 
We are asked to determme whether, pursuant to art1 
cle Xll of the Californta Constitution or legislative enact· 
ment. the Public Utilities Commisston (commissiOn) has)u-
nsdiction to adjudicate mtercsts In real property, and, 
so, the effect of such adJudication on the interests of 
sons who are not regulated utilities in that property. 
lioner Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. (CMWSl}, a regu-
lated utility, also challenges, as unsupported by the evi-
dence, the finding and conclusion of the commission that 
CMWSI is the holder of an extensive easement for water re-
source development and exploitation in lands in which it 
does not claJm an interest and to .which it does not hold ti· 
tie. 
On exammation of the record it appears that, in the ex· 
ercise of its ratemaking authority, the commisswn has 
done no more than construe deeds conveying real property 
and easements to petitioner and its predecessor. It has 
done so in the same manner that a court or agency con· 
strucs any written instrument (see Civ. Code,§ 1066 et seq.; 
i j 
f ! 
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Code Civ. Proc.-, U 1857, 2077) for the purpose of ascertain· 
ing facts relevant to the me1it.s of the application for in· 
creased rates, not for the purpose of resolving disputes be· 
tween parties claim in& ri&ht.s under the deed or to enforce 
rights conveyCd by those deeds. The commission acknowl-
edges lhatitdocs noth;lvejurisdiclion equivalent to that of 
a court, to adjudicate incidont.softiUe, and that ll would be 
bound by a judicial ruling in a quictlille action brought by 
any person claiming an interest in the subject property 
who believes the commission rutin& clouds h1s lillo. (Code 
Civ. Proc .• §.760.010 etscq.) 
The only issues properly before us in lhis proceeding, 
there tore, arc whether the evidence supports the commis-
sion's construction of the deeds in issue, and 1ts deciSion, 
based on that construction, to deny in part petitioner's ap-
plication for a rate increase. In undertaking that review 
lhis cou1·t is limited to determining if the commission has 
regularly pursued its authority. Factual findings of lhe 
commission arc not reviewable unless a petitioner asserts 
that the peUtioner's constitutional rights have been viol at· 
ed. <Pub. Util. Code,§§ 1757,1760.)1 SinceCMWSI makes no 
such claim. and there is evidence to support the commis· 
sion decision. we shall atnrm. 
I 
This dispute arises in majorpartbccauscwclls located 
on a 16-acrc parcel orland owned by CMWSI no longer sup-
ply water to the system which serves approximately 350 
customers in or ncar lhc Sonoma County community of 
Camp Meeker. Wells on an adjacent parcel, the 
"Cbcnowclh parcel," which is a watershed for the CMWSI 
land, currcnUy supply approximately half of the water 
needed by the utility. CMWSI is wholly owned by members 
ofthe Chenoweth family, who arc also the record title own-
ers of the Chenoweth parcel. The CMWSI and Chenoweth 
parcels were conveyed to the Chenowcths in 1951 by mem· 
bers of the Meeker family who then owned and operated 
lhc Camp Meeker Water System <CMWS). The Chenowcths 
incorporated the utility in 1959. 
In November 1983. CMWSI sought a rate increase 
ba:;cd on a claim that in order to meet the needs of iUi cus-
totnei'S for water CMWSI would have to lease additional 
wells on the Chenoweth parcel. Aficr extended hc•u·tngs, 
and rehearing. in decision No. 89-10-033, the commrss10n 
concluded that CMWSI owns an cascmenllh<tt permits ilto 
obtain water from the enUre 600·acrc Chc;noweth Witter-
shed, ilOd therefore is not obligated to compensate the Chc-
nowelhs for its exercise of that ca~cmcnt, or to pass on the 
cost of future well site usc lo the ratepayers. 
Thts proceeding arises on the petition ofCMWSI for 1·e-
vicw of that decision. As we have noted, and will cxplam in 
greater detail below. lhc commtssion decision construed 
two 1951 deeds. the lirstofwhich conveyed CMWS, the six· 
teen-acre parcel ofland on which the water systmn is toe at· 
(:d, <llld the easements in issue here to the Chcnowcths. The 
second conveyed the lands making up the 600-acrc parcel 
to the Chcnowcths and again conveyed to them property 
ownt•d by CMWS. The t·ommission found that the first of 
the~c deeds conveyed an casement for water rights on the 
adJacent 600-acre Chenoweth parcel which the grantors 
had nol yeltransfcn·cd to the Chcnowelhs. Biiscd on that 
t·onstruction 1tordcred: 
l. CMWSI to enforce those water rights against the 
record titleholders; 
2. CMWSI to record a notice of intent to preserve 1ts 
easements pursuant to Civil Code section 877.060;2 
3. The commission's Advisory and Compliance Divi· 
SIOiltO intervene in proceedings before the Stale Water Re-
sources Control Boilfd lo prevent the record titleholders of 
thl' Chenoweth parcel from obtaining rights inconsistent 
wtth those held byCMWSl under its casement; 
4. The Advi:;ory and Comf,lliance Division to forward 
cotlics of the decision to title insurance companies and 
take other steps to ensure that any future purchaser ofthc 
burdened 600-acrc property would have actual notice of 
the casement. 
The commission, relying on cases decided under Code 
or Civil Procedure secUon 902, opposed issuance of t.llc 
wntofrevicwon the ground thalCMWSI was nota party ag-
gncvcd by tts decision. The right to petition this court for 
n'v1cw of a decision of the commission is governed by sec-
llonl756. however. Thul section expressly authori2es a pc· 
l!ltOil by an applicant for I'ChCal'ing before the COmmission. 
Nonetheless. because CMWSl benefits from the commis· 
>lOll ruling that il holds casements In the Chenoweth par. 
eel, 1Ls stilnding lo complam that the factual findings un-
derlying the decision arc erroneous extends only to the im-
pm:l of that decision on its application for a rate increase. 
The jumdictional claim, and the related assertion that by 
dcl<'rmining CMWSl's interests in the Chenoweth parcel 
the rommiss1on denied due process to members ofthe Che· 
nowrth family who are record titleholders, will not be con-
S!dered.3 
Because the commission regularly pursued its author-
ity In reaching its decision, the only issue to be addressed is 
CMWSI's claim that the commission's finding that CMWSl 
owns rights to substantially all, if not all, wells, stored sur-
face water, and surface runoff ortile Chenoweth parcel, is 
not supported by lhe evidence. 
u 
PROCEDURAlJEVIDENTIARY HISTORY 
CMWSI nlcd its application for authority to increase 
revenues from $34,200 to $53,800 (a 57.3 percent increase) 
on November 13, 1983. A 12.74 percent offset increase was 
authorized by resolution on November 22, 1983, after 
which hearings were held addressed to the balance of the 
requested increase, an end to an existing moratorium on 
new conneclions, and a 6.5 percent attrition increase. On 
September 19, 1984,thc eommissiongranted an increase of 
19.46 percent. continued the ban on new connections, 
gnmled attrilion increases, and found: 
"11. Members oflhc Meeker family, original owners of 
the water system at Camp Meeker, executed a deed convey-
in~( all but approximately 16acrcs ofthc land on which the 
water system was located to members of the Cl)enoweth 
r;unily on Novcmbe1· 29. 1951, without commission au tho· 
nzation. 
"12. The question of fact as to whether the property de-
seethed 10 lhc Meeker deed of November 29, 1951 con· 
unncd only private nonulility property and no public uti I· 
ity water resources has not bcqn presented to the Cpmmis· 
s1on for its determination.'' · 
The commisst'on then concluded: 
.. The deed from lhc Sonoma County Land Title Com· 
pany to Hardin T. Chenoweth. William C. Chenoweth, and 
L. C. Chenoweth dated November 29. 1951 is void for want 
orauthori2alion by the Commission. "1 
Hehcarmg was granted on February 6, 1985,1imited to 
treatment of the Chenoweth parcel. Two years of unsuc· 
ccssful negotiations between the owners ofthat parcel and 
the commission's Division of Ratepayers' Advocates 
{ D ItA). cnsuc.d. Resumption of evidentiary hearings before 
the administrative law judge <AWl were delayed until Jan-
uary 1988. by the death of William Chenoweth. president of 
CMWSI. 
Al the hearings a reprcscnt.at1ve ofDRA testified. DRA 
recommended that the commission declare the Chc· 
nowcth parcel. on which the several wells sought to be 
leit5Cd by CMWSI were located. to be public utility prop· 
erty used and useful in the public utility watc1· service of 
CMWSI. That recommendation became the central issue in 
the h<'in·ings. The DUA reprcsenta.livc testified that he be· 
lievcd CMWSI was entitled to water from lllc Chenoweth 
parcel. bul conceded that he had nol found recorded cvi· 
<lcll('l' to support his conclusion lhal the well sites 011 the 
Chl'IIOW<'lh puree! had been dedicated to public utility usc. 
CM W~l oll'<.'l'ed documentary evidence daling back to 1932 
- ---- A. .A.& A ·-
r 
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to support Jts claim that the Meeker family had seireiated 
the family and utility propemes. 
Among those documents was a summary of evidence 
made by the commiSSIOn stalfin 1932 in conjunction w1th a 
CMWS rate jncrease request. That summary mcluded a 
cost estimate of the value of lands reserved for spnngs and 
water tank sJtes. apparently refemng to sites on the Che-
noweth parcel. Reference was also made to an expense 
item for taxes, part of which was determmed to be charge-
able to the applicants' pnvate realty holdings. 
Other documents irom the 1932 rate proceedings in-
cluded a land and nght-of-way appraisal exhibit prepared 
by the commission staff which ret1ected an Inventory of 11 
parcels or lots owned by CMWS, the total acreage of which 
was 15.75 acres. No properties other than those parcels 
which contained spnngs,d1vers10ns. or tanks actually used 
or proposed for utdtty servtce were ident.ified in that in-
ventory. 
·A ledger sheet from the 1935 records of the Sonoma 
County Tax Collector Identified 21 properties as associ-
ated w1th CMWS, but those parcels did not conform in all 
respects to the commiSSIOn's 1932 inventory. An inventory 
of the estate of Efl1e M. Meeker, who died intestate in 1940, 
was filed in 1941. That wventory listed her interest in 
"Camp Meel<er Water System lo\.S" whose descriptions, 
with a smgle exception, corresponded to the lots listed as 
associated with CMWS m the 1935 records of the tax collec-
tor. A handwritten annotation m the margin recited: 
·'Appraised as part of water system." Other lots in the es-
tate's wventory did not appear on the tax collector's list 
and were not among CMWS properties. The appraisal of 
the estate's real property valued the properties of CMWS 
separately. 
In 1951 the estate of Effie Meeker agreed to sell to Har-
din T. Chenoweth, and h1s sons, William C. and L. C. Che-
noweth, 14 of the 17 distributive interests in the estate.s 
The estate contracted to sell those interests ln: 
''(1] all of the property owned by said Meeker Estate lo-
cated in the County of Sonoma ... , (2] together with the 
Camp Meeker Water System, and all other property both 
real and personal appurtenant to said system and used 
therefor, [3) together with all moneys m bank in the name of 
said Camp Meeker Water System, and all outstandmg re-
ceivables of the sa1d Camp Meeker Water System." 
The agreement provided that "[t]he property herein 
referred to and descnbed as the Camp Meeker property 
generally consists of [1) approximately 800 acres of land 
more or less located as aforesaid, (2] the Camp Meeker Wa-
ter System, and [3] the inventory of personal properties, to-
gether with the cash in bank in the name of said Camp 
Meeker Water System, and the accou11ts rcceivaoie. ·• 
The agreement also prOVided that the administratrices 
would cooperate in obtaming the approval of the commis-
Sion for the transfer ofCMWS, on which the agreement was 
conditioned, and, that: "It is fully understood and agreed 
by and between the parties hereto that the [administra-
tnces] have not ;omed m or been a party to the dedication 
of any ofsa1d property herem referred to for the purpose of 
the operation of the Camp Meeker Water System other 
than the acreage cons1stmg of 14 acres ;nore or less Imme-
diately surroundmg the vanous springs now used in the op-
eratiOn ofthe Camp Meeker Water System." 
On October 10. 1951, the administratrices, the Che-
noweths, and Paul R Edwards. who held a one-third inter-
est 1n the estate, sought. and on November 6, 1951, the com-
miSSion granted, aulhonty for the tr. :1;fcr ofCMWS to the 
Chcnoweths. The commiSSion opinion acknowledged that 
the estate was transfernng properties other than its inter-
est 1n CMWS, and noted that of the $24,880.28 purchase 
pnce. $8,500 had been assigned to CMWS, and the balance 
to "certain non"Operative lands." The opmion also noted 
that the purchasers Intended to acquire the remaimng in-
terests in the estate "to the end that they will have entire 
ownership of the water system propert1es." 
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Of particular 1m portance m the 
November 26, 1951, and November 29, 
which the properties were to 
The first deed, executed on Noveln!l!~r 
[italics added]: 
" ... all of the right, 
ors that certain 
ma, State of California, generally 
Meeker Water System, including all 
ered or on the surface, used and 
water to customers of said System, all 
facilities of every kind and character used 
operation of said System, and also aU 
cs, and easements had, used, and 
of said and also ali water and 
nant to said system and used and 
and also all tanks, reservoirs, 
and ditches leading thereto 
''All real ... used in connection 
Meeker Water a public utility, 
lowing parcels property 
totallingjustover fifteen acres, ten 
"Together with any and aU other 
or heretofore- used as springs, rel;ervmrs 
connection with sa1d CamoMeeker 
utility."(ltalicsadded.) · 
The concluding paragraphs 
in conJUnction wtth the sale 
-sellers were conveying all water 
purtenant to the property used by 
"Together with water and water rights 
to and belonging to the above descnbed land, and 
es, pipes, and improvements, and all rights, 
easements belongmg thereto or commonly 
enjoyed therewith, together with all ofthe ne•><SO:!Ia! 
erty used in the conduct and operation 
Meeker Water System and owned in common by 
grantors herein. · 
It is the intent and purpose ofthis Deed and nsl:rum~m 
of transfer to convey not only the properties 
described herein, but also all rights,lll:u!l!!ntll'!~~t£. 
leges and facilities appurtenant to said 
ter System and commonly used, and enul.'li'!ill 
maintenance and operation thereof, wheU1er exorE~sslv 
scnbed herein or not, and this deed shall 
as to accomplish such purpose." (Italics added.) 
The second deed, executed on 
veyed to the Chenoweths five specifically 
"Highland Farms" parcels comprising48.4 
eels subtitled "Timberland and acreage," 
was the north one-half of the 
t10n 27 "except portions heretofore conveyed, 
ing Camp Meeker Wate1· System lots"; lots in five 
sions of the Camp Meeker area subtitled 
lands''.; and under the subtitle "Camp Meeker 
tem," two categories of property: 
l. "All parcels of land standing 
Meeker WaterSvstem. a Public utili tv. 
· 2. "Church, Camp Meeker Store, 
buildmg, library and water building sites. 
' ' 
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specifically described In the earlier deed would be con-
veyed. 
Hitchcock also stated that CMWS bad been recogmzed 
as a public utility by the California Railroad Commission, 
the predecessor to the present commission, and was such 
al the time of its acquisition by the Chenoweths. The term 
··used and useful" in the November 26, 1951, deed was in-
tended by both the grantees and grantors to include pipes, 
connections and facilities; the term ''water and water 
nghts" appurtenant to the system and useful in 1ts opera-
lion was intended to include only the water, water nghts, 
priv lieges, and easements on property owned by CMWS as 
described in that deed. 
Hitchcock had mqu1red, prior to the purchase of the 
system by the Chen~weths, if any watershed other than 
those in the acreage expressly owned by CMWS had been 
dedicated for water supply purposes to the ut11i ty. At an en-
suing meeting with commission staff member Coleman, 
Hitchcock was told by Coleman that he had no knowledge 
of any watersheds or lands encumbered, encroached upon, 
or dedicated to serve CMWS for the purpose of securmg a 
cater supply other than the acreage expressly owned by 
CMWS. Coleman represented that ifthere were such rights 
he would be aware of them. The November 26, 1951, deed 
was prepared for the grantors and grantees with this un-
derstanding and with the intent that it be interpreted con· 
sistenUy with Coleman's representations. 
Finally, Hitchcock declared that CMWS and the prop-
ea1.y it owned at ali times had been treated by the grantors 
as distinct and separate from that other property which 
they owned and conveyed to the Chenoweths. The deed of 
November 26,1951, pertained only to properties owned by 
CMWS and those properties were described in that deed. 
No other properties owned by the grantors were intended 
to be impressed with a watershed easement for the benefit 
ofCMWS. 
Based on this evidence, the ALI concluded thatCMWSI 
had no easement rights over the Chenoweth parcel. He rea-
soned that the language of the November 26, 1951, deed 
was not ambtguous and could not be interpreted to convey 
nghts in the surrounding lands, and was consistent with 
the intentions ofthe parties as expressed in the 1951 agree· 
menL 
Thus, the surrounding lands, including the well sites 
developed by the Chenoweths and leased to CMWS1 were 
not dedicated to public utility water service. 
The commtsston reached a contrary conclusion in its 
October 12, 1989, decision.7 That decision. like the pro-
posed decisiOn of the ALJ, concluded that the 1951 convey· 
anccs to the Chenoweths were proper since they repre· 
sen ted a commonly understood segregation of the Meeker 
property between public utility and private property for 
tax and ratemaking purposes. 8 The commission also con· 
eluded that the November 26, 1951, deed conveyed the 
CMWS real estate and all water rights, easements and priv· 
tlegcs appurtenant thereto. The November 29, 1951, deed 
conveyed the remaimng Meeker land. 
Unlike the AI...J, however, the commis-sion concluded 
that while the property conveyed by the November 29, 
1951, deed was th~ pnvate real estate ofthe Chenowcths, it 
was: "subject to the public utility water rights, easements 
and privilegesgrar.ted by the November26, 1951 deed. 
"The rights g1ven to CMWS by the November 26, 1951 
deed (and subsequently given to Camp Meeker Water Sys-
tem, Incorporated (CMWSl) by the August 7, 1959 deed\~ al-
low the utility to explore for and develop public ut11ity wa-
ter sources on the Chenoweth land, and to take such ac· 
tions as may be necessary to ensure that the Chenoweths do 
not jeopardize the ability of the water system to meet its 
public utility obligations. TheChenoweths are free, howev· 
er, to use the1r land as they see fit so long as that use is con-
sistent w1th the utility's rights and easements." 
The comm1ssion reasoned that the Meekers as owners 
ofCMWS did not have a formal casement over the nonoper-
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commission applied Civil 
case law requir· 
conveyed, the rela-
""'""''rtv owned by the re-
ascmame contemplation of 
were to be. 
of Los Angeles U967) 67 
n"'""""' (1950) 35 Cal.2d 5, 10; 
........ ".uu . .>u 561, 569; and George 
861·862.) Based 
res1S011ed that could interpret 
the water company 
"'"'"''"''""'"rights. The language 
1951, commission conclud-
ed, conveyed to "broad rights wat{.lr from the 
land subject to the easements. 
These rights were not limited to use of the wells or wa-
ter sources from which CMWSI water in 1951 when 
and diversions 
l 
l 
i 
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Ill 
COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
Petitioner assumes that the commiSSion has under· 
taken to adjudicate Incidents of title, and has adjudicated 
the rights of third parties agamst the public utility. It ar-
gues on that basis that the commiSSion has exceeded its au· 
thority and has taken, on behalf of the utility, property 
owned by the third part1es wtthoutcompensation. 
As noted earlier, however, the commtssion makes no 
cla1m to have such JUrisdiction. Rather. 1t purports only to 
have construed the ex1stmg legal rights ofCMWSI, and dis-
claims any power to create new nghts. The commission ex· 
pressly recogn1zes that its functions do not include deter· 
mmtng the validity of contracts, whether claims may be as· ·--
serted under a contract, or interests m or title to property, 
those being questions for the courts. (Hanlon v. Eshleman 
(1915) 169 Cal. 200. See also C.B. Lee (1939) 42 C.R.C. 41.) It 
claims only the power to construe, for purposes of exercis· 
ing•its regulatory and ratemakmg authority, the existing 
nghts of a regulated utility. 
In construmg the 1951 deeds for that purposa, the com· 
m1ss1on acted within tts constitutional and statutory juris· 
diction. 
"PI'ivate corporations and persons that own, operate, 
control, or manage a ... system for the ... furnishing of ... 
water ... are public utilities subject to control by the Legis· 
lature." <Cal. Const., art. XII,§ 3.) The commission may, 
pursuant to the grant of authority found m article XII, sec· 
tJOn 2 of the Caltfornta Constitution "(s]ubject to statute 
and due process ... establish its own procedures." And, 
pursuant to article X11. section 5, "[t)he Legislature has 
plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this 
constitution, but consistent with this article, to confer ad· 
d1t1onal authority and jurisdiction upon the commission, .. 
In lhe exercise of its plenary power the Legislature has 
provtded that all charges by a public utility for commodi· 
ties or services rendered shall be just and reasonable(§ 
451) and has gtven the comm1sston the power and obliga-
tton todetermme not only that any rate or mcrease in a rate 
;; JUSt and reasonable <§§ 454, 728), but also authority to 
··supervise and regulate every public utility in the State 
and [to] do all thmgs, whether specifically designated ln 
this part or m addition thereto, which are necessary and 
conven1ent 1n the exerc1se of such power and jurisdic· 
tion." (§ 701.) 
In regulatmg a public utility the comm1ssion may de· 
term me the facilities, service, and method of service in or-
der to ensure that the service provided is adequate(§ 761), 
and 1n aid thereof may order that the utility extend or im· 
prove 1ts physical facilities or properties (§ 762.) 
Further, a public utility may not dispose of any prop-
erty necessary and useful in the performance of its dutirlS 
Without authorization by the commission. (§ 851.) While 
th1s section ts most often applied to outright transfers of 
property, read together w1th the above sections which au-
thonze the commiSSIOn to require that a utility ensure its 
ab11Jty to prov1de adequate service, it unqueEtionably per-
;nits the commiSSion to prevent disposal of such property 
by 1nd1rection, as by failure to exercise or safeguard rights 
possessed by the utility. (Civ. Code,§ 811, subds. 3 & 4. See 
also. Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. (1934) 220 Cal. 295, 
309-310.) 
Therefore, constructiOn of the November 26, 1951, 
deed in reference to the transfer of the appurtenant Cne-
noweth parcel in order to determme CMWSI's rights to 
sources of water on the Chenoweth parcel was a necessary 
incident to the commission's consideration ofCMWSI's ap-
plication for an increase 10 its charges. The commission 
was obligated to determ1ne if the claimed expense for leas· 
mg wells on the Chenoweth parcel was justified, and to en· 
sure that CMWSI did not abandon or otherwise dispose of 
property 1n the form of easement rights necessary and use· 
v 
sian's factual 
and conclusions are 
decision, fUrther review 
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...,._ ... ~ .... -. 41 Ca.l.2d 354, · 
tbewttptto 
9ftbe 
commissioa. t~~B~IIAWIIII (1J'7t) 
23 Cal.3d 638.) . . 
While s~!itiot J'78Ct ~-~ tbt. power to exer-
cise its independe&ltj~J·~-.~e ia~J aDd the facts if an 
order or decision· of Ule .ccquwaion is ehaUeneed on 
grounds that it violata &at flllderal constitutional rights of 
the petitioner, no claim to which section 1760 applies is 
properly before u. · 
CMWSl does aque that the commiuion lacks jurisdic· 
tlon to determine thl,'.ri&hts of third parties, a due process· 
based claim, or~te private property without compensa-
tion, a claim pmu{llably founded in tbe Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Unitllld States Constitution. We 
have concluded above, however, that the comm1sston has 
not purported to affect title or create interests in CMWSI 
and has done nothina more than construe the 1951 deeds 
for purposes ofratemaldna only. 
More imponantly, however, the decision that CMWSl 
holds an easement over the Chenoweth parcel is one favor· 
able to CMWSI, which does not claim that the decision vio· 
lates rights it has as the petitioner. The sole question, 
therefore, is whether there is an evidentiary basis in the 
record for the commission's conclusion that the November 
26, 1951, deed conveyed an easement for water develop-
ments on the Chenoweth parcel to CMSWI. There is. 
B. Evidence Supporting the Decision. 
l.TheDeed. 
The November 26, 1951, deed expressly conveyed to 
CMWSI all of the grantor's interest in CMWS and all 
"easements had, used, and enjoyed in the operation of said 
System, and also all water and water rights appurtenant to 
said System and used or useful in its operation." 
It is axiomatic, as the commission recognized, that an 
easement conveys rights in or over the land of another. "An 
ease men~ involves primarily the privilege of doing a cer· 
tain act on, or to the detriment of, another's property. To 
the creation of an appurtenant easement, two tenements 
are necessary, a dommantone in favor of which the obliga· 
lion exists, and a servient one upon which the obligation 
rests." (Wright v. Best (1942) 19 Cal.2d 368, 381. See also, 
Los Angeles etc. Co. v. S.P.R.R. Co. (1902) 136Cal. 36, 48.) 
The 16-acre parcel and the Chenoweth parcel had, \ln· 
til the November 26, 1951, conveyance, been in the same 
ownership, notwithstanding the Meekers' separate treat· 
ment of the for tax and other recordkeeping pur· 
poses. That so, the deed cannot reasonably be con 
strued as either creatmg or conveying a then-existing ease-
ment burdening the 16·acre parcel. The only theory on 
which such a conveyance might be premised, revivo:l of sm 
easemellt existing pr1or to merger ofthe dominant and ser· 
vient estates (iee Civ. Code,§ 811, subd. 1; Dixon v. Scher· 
meier (1805) 110 Cal. 582, 585; 28 Ca!.Jur.3d (rev.) Ease-
ml!nts, § p. 188), is unsupported by any evidence that 
such ease lent existed prior to the acquisition oftille to the 
p1·operties by the Meeker family. The deed therefore ere· 
atcd an easement under which the CMWS-property be-
came the dominant tenement, holding an easement appur· 
tenant to that land over property in the possession ofanoth· 
er16 
The lang-uage of the November 26, 1951, deed therefore 
supports the commission finding that tile deed conveyed 
an easement over lands appurtenent to CMWS and its 16-
acre parceL 
·~-- 2. The Burdened Property. 
There 1s also a basis in the evtdence for tile findings 
and conclusion of the commission that the easement con-
veyed was, by implication, a burden on the Chenoweth par· 
eel. It is not necessary to its validity that the conveyance of 
an express easement identify the servient tenement. The 
law that a conveyance of real property creates in 
favor property "an easement 1.0 use other real prop-
12977 
erty of the person whose estate transferred in the same 
manner and to the same as sucb property was obvi· 
ously and permanently used the whose estate is 
transferred, for the at the when tile 
transfer was Code, § 
1104.) "The extent of a servitude determined by the 
terms of the or the nature ofthe enjoyment by which 
1t was acquired. 800.) ltma:v reasonably be in-
ferred, therefore, that the granted in 
the November26, l95l, deed burdened retained prop-
erty of tile grantor, the 600-acre retained by the 
Meeker estate. 17 When the 600-acre parcel was conveyed 
by the November 29, 1951, deed, it continued to be the ser· 
v1ent tenement. 
3 The E:dent oft he Euement. . 
Because the November 26, 1951, deed expressly 
granted an easement over the Chenoweth property it is not 
necessary to find an easement implication, and the 
section 1104 to uses in 
existence at the time of the agreement andior conveyance. 
The well-established law governing easements by implica, 
tion is instructive, however, when the deed does not de· 
scrsbe the e:dentofthe easement it conveys. 
In Fristoe v. supra, 35 Cal.2d 5, 9·10, we ac· 
cepted the rule as set the Restatement of Property: 
"'The extent ofan is to be 
inferred from the circumstances which at the time of 
the conveyance and give rise to the Among 
these circumstances is the use which is made of the 
dominant tenement at that time. Yet it does follow that 
the use authorized is to be to use as was re· 
quired by the dominant at that time. It is to be 
measured rather such uses parties might reason· 
ably have from uses of the dominant 
tenement. the reasonably have ex-
pected is circumstances exist· 
ing at the of the conveyance. It is to be assumed that 
they anticipated such uses as 
quired a normal de\•el!l~Dm 
ment ... 
cordingly, in 
extent of the grantee's 
notonlyto the actual 
erance, but also to such facts and circumstances 
show were within the reasQ!'lable contemplation of the par-
lies at the time of the conveyance." 
This rule applies to express easements 
when the extent of the easement question. "The effect 
ofsection 806 ofthe Civil is to establish intent as the 
criterion for determining the 'extent of a servitude,' and 
this is in accord with the rationale of the rules governing 
easements by implication. (Fristoe Drapeau, 35 Cal.2d 5, 
9 )" (M<~sier v. Mead (1955) 45 Ca!.2d 629, 633.) The rule is 
tempered, of course, by the limitation that if an "easement 
is founded upon a . , only those interests expressed 
in the grant and incident thereto pass 
from the owner ofthe fee. general rule is clearly estab· 
lished that, despite the easement, the owner 
of the servient tenement may make any use ofthe land that 
does not interfere unreasonably w11.h the easement. "(Pas· 
adena v. etc, supra, 17 CaL2d 576, 
579.) 
There is evidence in th~ to support the finding 
of the commission that the easement granted by the No-
'lember 26, 1951, deed permits CMWSI to exploit any and 
all &ourcesofwateron the Chenoweth parcel. The deed did 
not restrict CMWS to use ofthe wells or springs existing at 
the lime ofthe conveyance. Rather, the grant mcluded "all 
water rights appurtenant to said System and used or useful 
in ii.S operation" and "whether described ... or 
noL" (Italics added.) The reasonably in· 
fer from this in which the 
conveyance was that the easement permits CMWSI 
to use any water sources necessary to replace springs that 
,. 
f 
' i 
\ 
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are no longer adequate and to develop water sources 
needed to meet the demands created by "normal develop· ·, 
ment of the dommant tenement." (Fristoe v. Drapeau, su· 
pra,35Cal.2d 5, 9.) 
The commissions construction of the easement is con· 
s1stent with and supported by the assumption that an ex· 
press easement is mtended to accommodate future needs. 
(Fa us v. City ofLos Angeles, supra,67 Cal.2d 350,355.) 
4. Relevance of Separate Transfer of Chenoweth Par• 
eel. · 
Petitioner claims alternatively that the two deeds in 
question conclusively establish that the Chenoweth parcel 
IS not useful or necessary. 
Petitioner's argument is based on the stipulation in 
sectiOn 851 that. "any d1spos1t10n of property by a public 
utility shall be conclusively presumed to be of property 
which IS not useful or necessary 10 the performance of its 
dut1es to the public. as to any purchaser, lessee, or encum-
brancer dealing with such property m good faith for value;. 
" Petitioner reasons that the commission's approval of 
the sale of the 16-acre parcel separately from the Che· 
noweth parcel established that the latter was not useful or 
necessary for pub! ic benefit. 
Ourconc!us10r., that there IS an .ovidentiarybasis in the 
record for the comm1sswn's conclusiOn that the November 
26. 1951. deed conveyed to CMWSI an easement for the de· 
velopmcnt and explottation of such water nghts as are 
needed to adequately service CMWSI's customers, an-
;wers that contention. 
Inasmuch as the November 26, 1951, conveyance in· 
eluded an easement for water r1ghts 1n the Chenoweth par· 
eel. the commiSSIOn cannot be deemed to have determined 
that this parcel was not useful to CMWS. To the contrary, 
the manner in which the sale was structured preserved for 
the utility a "useful" interest 1n that property, an easement 
that IS "necessary in the performance of[CMWSI's) duties 
to the public. "18 
The decisiOn 1s therefore supported by evidence in the 
1 ecord. The inferences drawn from that evidence are rea-
sonable. The findings and conclusions are not subject to 
further rev1ew. The commiSSIOn did not err in determining 
the legal significance of its findings m construmg the No-
vember 26,1951, deed. 
y 
Commission declSlon No. 89-10-033 is affirmed. 
We concur: 
LUCAS,C.J. 
:\IOSK,J. 
BROUSSARD,J 
PANELLl,J. 
KENNARD,J. 
ARABIAN,J. 
EAGLESONJ. 
1 All further-references to code sectiOns herein are to the Pub· 
ltc Uttlities Code unless otherwtse Indicated. 
2. Civil Code section 877060, subdivision (aJ: "The owner of an 
easement may at any ume record 4 notice of Intent to preserve the 
easemenl" 
3. Those claims, whtch attempt to assert the rights of other par-
tie>. assume that the commiSSIOn decision has 1 ;;~JUdicata effect 
and may be btnd1ng m future ratemaktng or JUdlcJal proceedings. 
Pursuant to >tCtJOn 1709, the cornmtsston deCision·· that CM· 
WSlts not presently ent•tlcd to a rate increase·· JS binding as, "[ijn 
all collateral act1ons or procecdmgs, the orders and deCISIOns oftho: 
commtsston wh1ch have become nnal shall be conclusive." The 
P•lbllc Ut1lit1es Code does not give the ruling any greater. effect 
Th 1s court has recognized that when the commissiOn exercises tl~ 
JUdicial power, 1ts orders or deCISIOns have "the conclustve etrectol 
res Judicata as to the 1ssues Involved where they are agam brought 
1nto question 10 subsequent proceedmgs between the same par-
lies.· !People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 630.) 
However. the commission exerctses 1ts legislative power, not its JU· 
d1c1al power, when 1t nxes rates (People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 
42 Cal.2d 621, 630; Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad Com. (1924) 194 
Tuesday,NovembedO, 1990 
<;a!. 734. 739.) Therefore. 
subJeCt to relitigation 111 all¥ court of 1•111 
m !ne these inU:rests. . 
5. The actinlllldministratrices had at that time obtained 
mentonly from the holders ofthose interests. 
of the grantee, 
grant by a public or body, as 
interpreted in favorofthegrantor." 
were aware of this order when 
knewoffindings in 
spring sources and supplies was 
vice. The only such earlier proceeding to reference 
made by the commission took m Hl32. The commission 
sian does not further explam relevance ofthe findings 
that year or a fits conclusion that the Meekers were aware 
cessity that resources on the segregated private real estate 
of the Meeker.; be developed. 
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17. There is no evidence in the rec:on1, and no party hu suuest· 
ed, that CMWS or the Meek~r~r 11mlly held utility easements over 
land owned by customen of the utility. <See, e.c., Pasadena v. Call· 
fornia·Mlchlaan etc. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576.) A reasonable infer-
ence, therefore. is that thearanton intended to convey an easement 
over Ole 600-ac:re parcel they retained. 
18. Bued in part on ita uaumption that tile commtuton dec!· 
sion was intended to acijudicate the Incidents of title to tile Che· 
noweth parcel, ralher than consll\le the deed to the 16 acre parcel 
now owned by CMWSI, petitioner auerta the commtuton proce· 
durca were irre&lllar beeauae the iuu.e of ownenhip of Chenoweth 
parcel waa not properly before it and the recon1 owners of that par· 
eel were notciven noUce. They alaoaeektoau.pport thi5 challence to 
the procedure with a claim that the 1951 proceedinc in which the 
commission authorized the aale of the uUiil)' was conclusive. Our 
conclusion that the commluion properly conatrued the November 
2Jl,l!l51, dee~. and purporte<1todo nothinc more, maku itu.nneces· 
sary to addreulhisclalm fUrther. 
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CRIMINAL LAW 
AND PROCEDURE 
Lack of Fine Advisement Merits 
Remand for Plea Withdrawal 
Cile asOOPailyJournal D.A.R.l2979 
PEOPLE OFT HE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JOHN THOMAS GLENNON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No.A047950 
Super. Ct. No.l31918 
California Court of Appeal 
First Appellate District 
Division One 
Filed November HI, 1900 
The sole issue raised by this appeal is whether a resh· 
tution fine of $10,000 should be stricken because the trial 
court failed to advise appellant of the ime prior to accept-
m~: his plea of no contest. We conclude that although appel-
lanthas failed to show that he was prejudiced by the court's 
failure to so advise, he must be eiven the opportunity to 
withdraw his plea. 
FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
Appellant was the purchasing manager for the 
biochemistry and biophysics-departments of the Univer· 
sity t>f California at San Francisco. Utilizing his own out· 
side company, appellant engaged in a number of t'raudu· 
lent sales to the .. umversity which were accomplished by 
means of appellant's position as purchasing manager. 
Prior to the preliminary hearing, appellant pleaded no 
contest to the charge that he misappropriated over 
$300,000 in state funds over a period of 10 years while em-
ployed by the univ.li·ilit,y. (Pen. Code, f 424, subd. (1),) He 
also admitted the special allegation that the amount taken 
was over $100,000 thereby exposing himself to an addi· 
tiona I two-year term. (Pen. Code,§ 12022.6, subd. (b).) 
Prior to entering this plea, appellant was advised of 
and waived his constitutional righ~ 1 After he was advised 
of the range of punishment for the of the applica-
ble parole period, and the consequences revocation of 
parole, appellant entered a of no contest to all charg· 
es. This plea was "open court" and was not the result 
of negotiations with the prosecutor; however, the sentenc-
ing judge had indicated that a two-year prison term ap-
peared to be an appropriate disposition. The requirement 
of a restitution fine was not mentioned. 
Even though this was not a negotiated plea, appellant 
was advised that his plea was not binding on the court and, 
if the sentencing judge withdrew his approval of the indi· 
cated disposition, he would be allowed to withdraw his 
~- ' Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the mitigated 
term oftwo years in prison for the reason that he acknowl· 
edged his guilt at an early stage in the proceedings. A two-
year term for the special allegation was imposed but stayed 
because of appellant's lack of a prior criminal record. The 
court also imposed a restitution fine of$10,000, as required 
by Government Code section 13967, subdivision (c). Appel-
!antdu:! notobjectto the fine at the time of sentencing. 
DISCUSSION 
This appeal is taken only from the sentence. Appellant 
does not challenge the validity of his plea of no contest. 
Since the restitution fine was a direct consequence of the 
plea, appellant should have been informed of the possibil· 
ity of a fine prwr to of his plea. Appellant, having 
served a substantial of his sentence, asks that the 
tine be strtcken. 2 
The improper imposition of a restitution fine can re· 
suit fl'om twa distmct situations. Thus, a fine may exceed 
lhe permissible punishment allowed by the terms of a ne· 
gotlated disposition, or 1t may have been imposed after a 
failure to advise the defendant that the fine was a conse-
quence of a guilty plea. (People v. Davis {1988} 205 
Cai.App.3d 1305, 1308-1310.) In cases involving breach of 
the terms of a plea bargain, constitutional issues of due 
process are ra1sed. and the bargain may be enforced or the 
plea may be withdrawn depending on the facts of the case. 
(People v. Mancbeno (1982) 32 CaL 3d 855, 860-861.) In such 
situations, waiver ts not presumed from a failure to object 
at the t1mc of sentencing. (I d. at p. 864; but see People v. 
Davis, supra, 205 CaLApp.3d 1305; People v. Melton (1990) 
218 CaLApp.3d 1406.) Also, the harmless error test of Peo-
ple v: Watson (1956}46 Ca!.2d 836, is inapplicable. (Peo-
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Chairman Rosenthal, Chairman Lockyer and members of the Committees: 
My name is Bruce Jamison. I am Assistant Vice President for Regulatory 
Proceedings at Pacific Bell. I am pleased to join you this afternoon to 
discuss the need for reform of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) 
procedures. Pacific Bell has thoroughly reviewed the two pieces of 
legislation, SB 1041 and SB 1042, resulting from Senator Roberti's 
investigation of complaints about CPUC processes that was initiated with 
Preprint SB 8 last year. My written testimony addresses specifically the 
changes in law that would be made by the two bills Senator Roberti has 
introduced this session and the problems Pacific Bell sees with these changes. 
Analysis of Issues in SB 1041 
1) Change in Appellate Jurisdiction 
The major change in the law that would be made by SB 1041 is the elimination 
of the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court for appeal of CPUC 
decisions. This change is made in Section 4 of the bill by amending Section 
1756(a) of the Pub. Util. Code to provide for review of CPUC actions by the 
Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District. 
The reason that has been cited previously for proposing this change is the 
ever increasing workload of the Supreme Court. Pacific firmly believes that 
changing the appellate jurisdiction for Commission decisions to the Court of 
Appeal would not decrease the Supreme Court's workload. Rather, it would only 
result in unnecessary delays in the implementation of Commission decisions by 
adding another layer of appellate review, since it is highly likely the 
majority of Appellate Court decisions would be appealed to the Supreme Court. 
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Intermediate review by the Court of Appeal would also significantly increase 
utilities' costs. Not only will utilitie's be financially impacted by delays 
in the implementation of decisions and collection of new rates, but utilities' 
costs will also be increased by the additional time it will take to bring a 
case to conclusion. 
2) Right to Review of CPUC Decisions 
Another change that SB 1041 makes in Section 1756(a) of the Pub. Util. Code 
would provide for reyiew of CPUC decisions as a matter of right, as opposed to 
the discretionary review currently exercised by the Supreme Court. In the 
corporation's review of Preprint SB 8, authored by Senator Roberti last year, 
Pacific Bell opposed the change from discretionary review to an automatic 
right to review. The reasons for this opposition are that discretionary 
review discourages frivolous appeals and reinforces the finality of Commission 
decisions. 
More appeals, including those without merit, occur when there is an automatic 
right to review. Appeals without merit are of particular concern due to the 
unnecessary expenditure of resources they require and the unfair advantage 
they provide to competitors wishing to delay utility actions approved by the 
Commission. Finality is very important for decisions involving telephone 
corporations because of the transitional nature of the telecommunications 
industry at this time. 
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3) Expansion of the Scope of Review 
Amendments to Section 1757 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 6 of SB 1041 
raise only one issue. The added language in this code section would expand 
the scope of review on appeal from the current rule limiting review to a 
determination of whether the CPUC has pursued its authority to also requiring 
that the appellate court determine whether any CPUC action under review is 
''supported by substantial evidence in the record of the proceeding." This 
expansion would make reviews of CPUC cases much more burdensome for both the 
court and the parties involved by requiring the appellate court to examine in 
detail the substance of CPUC decisions. 
A change in the current standard would open the door to judicial regulation 
and second-guessing by the judiciary. The fact that the CPUC is a 
constitutionally created body indicates the high value that should be accorded 
to the expertise of the Commission. The courts' responsibility in reviewing 
the orders of regulatory bodies, at both the state and federal level, has 
always been exclusively to determine the validity of such orders. To allow 
the courts to do other than decide questions of law, interpret constitutional 
and statutory provisions, and ascertain whether there is evidence to support 
the decision would subvert the judgment of the Commission. As the appointed 
experts and decision-makers on utility policy matters, the Commissioners are 
in the best position to evaluate the merits of different arguments and to make 
consistent policy decisions based upon their expertise. 
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4) Expansion of the Scope of Redress Available to the Courts 
Amendments to Section 1758 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 7 of SB 1041 also 
raise only one issue. The new language in this section would expand the 
redress available to the courts by directing the Court of Appeal or the 
Supreme Court not only to affirm or set aside a CPUC decision, but also to 
"afford other relief to effectuate its judgment." This expansion, along with 
the expansion of the scope of review, would severely undercut the authority of 
the Commission and even further intensify the negative impacts, discussed 
above, that would be caused by the expansion of the scope of review in 
Section 1757 of the Pub. Util. Code. Pacific strongly opposes any expansion 
in either the scope of review or redress that can be granted by a court 
reviewing CPUC decisions. 
Analysis of Issues in SB 1042 
1) Who May Bring a Complaint to the Commission 
k~endments to Section 1702 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 1 of SB 1042 
raise one issue. Language deleted from Section 1702(a) would make a 
significant change in the complaint process at the CPUC by removing the 
current limitations (including the requirement that not less than 25 consumers 
sign a complaint) on who may bring a complaint at the CPUC about the 
reasonableness of rates. Pacific is very much opposed to this proposed 
change. Pacific believes the requirement for 25 signatures, in particular, 
has prevented the filing of many frivolous complaints. 
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Utility rates are set by the Commission after lengthy proceedings. It is 
patently unfair to permit those rates to be later challenged by one individual 
after the numerous hours spent by many parties to determine what is a 
reasonable rate. Rates should only be permitted to be challenged when there 
are new and materially changed circumstances and when the complaint is signed 
by 25 or more consumers or one of the other parties now designated in 
Section 1702 of the Public Utilities Code. 
2) Change in the Role of ALJs 
Amendments to Section 1705 of the Pub. Util. Code in Section 3 of SB 1042 
raise one issue. Language added to Section 1705(c) would give ALJs more 
authority to make decisions independently of the Commissioners. This would be 
done by requiring the Commissioners to follow the factual findings of the ALJs 
and to explain their reasons for any substantive deviations from ALJs' 
decisions, thus giving ALJs the same responsibility as the Commissioners for 
decisions. This change confuses the roles of the ALJs and the Commissioners, 
conflicts with the constitutional authority granted to the Commissioners 
(e.g., to fix rates or establish rules for public utilities), and injects 
inconsistency into CPUC decisions. 
Commissioners are appointed by the Governor, with the approval of the 
legislature, and have ultimate responsibility for all decisions of the CPUC. 
ALJs are civil servants whose role is to gather information and compile the 
record upon which the Commissioners' decisions will be based. It is the 
Commissioners who must answer to the public. To give ALJs separate 
decision-making authority would essentially create two commissions, thereby 
usurping the constitutional authority of the CPUC and replacing it with one 
not accountable to the public. 
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Granting ALJs separate decision-making authority would place the Commissioners 
in the position of an appellate body with regard to ALJs' decisions, contrary 
to the state's constitutional provisions establishing the Commission as the 
primary decision-maker with regard to the implementation of public utility 
policy. Furthermore, this dual decision-making authority raises issues of 
consistency, arguing for a single point for setting regulations and making 
decisions governing the range of different cases arising at the CPUC. 
3) Rules for Ex Parte Contacts 
Section 4 of SB 1042 would adopt an Ex Parte Rule for the CPUC by adding 
Section 1705.5 to the Pub. Util. Code. This new law would, to a great extent, 
prohibit ex parte contacts. Specifically, the Ex Parte Rule proposed by this 
legislation does the following: 
(1) Commissioners would be prohibited from communicating orally or in 
writing with any "party" or ALJ in a pending "adjudicatory 
proceeding." Commissioners would be permitted to confer with the ALJ 
after a proposed decision has been issued. (See Section 1705.5(a)(1).) 
(2) If a prohibited communication occurs, the Commissioner would be 
required to file a notice of the communication and a summary of any 
oral communication or a copy of any written communication. An 
opportunity for rebuttal on the record would also have to be 
provided. (See Section 1705.S(a)(2).) 
(3) Communication with an Advisor to a Commissioner or any member of the 
Commission staff would be very limited since communication with these 
parties is prohibited to the extent it would circumvent the purpose of 
the Ex Parte Rule. (See Section 1705.S(a)(3).) 
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(4) Parties to an adjudicatory proceeding would be prohibited from 
communicating with the ALJ "except upon notice to all parties 
providing an opportunity to be heard." Upon receipt of such 
communication the ALJ would be required to file a notice of the 
communication and determine whether sanctions should be imposed. A 
party who violates this requirement may be required to show why their 
claim should not be "dismissed, denied, disregarded or otherwise 
adversely affected." (See Section 1705.5(b).) 
The draconian measures that would be imposed by this legislation would 
severely hinder the ability of the CPUC to function as a regulatory body. 
Good regulation of an industry is dependent on the free flow of information 
between the regulators and the regulated entities. The Ex Parte Rule proposed 
by SB 1042 emphasizes the prohibition of communications. A rule that instead 
emphasized disclosure and the obligation to rer.ort ex parte contacts on the 
record would be much more valuable and supportive of the regulatory process. 
Regulatory bodies like the CPUC perform quasi-legislative as well as 
quasi-judicial functions. Almost all cases before the CPUC are in some way 
legislative in nature, that is, they involve public policy issues. It is 
imperative that the CPUC's "constituency" be permitted to communicate with it 
for the Commission to be made aware of all the areas of concern and range of 
proposed solutions available. Pacific Bell believes the constraints on 
communication that would be imposed by the Ex Parte Rule in SB 1042 are so 
restrictive they would prevent the Commission from rendering decisions that 
are in the best interest of the public it serves. 
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An Ex Parte Rule should be simple, effective and as non-burdensome as possible 
for those subject to it. The rule set out in this legislation is ambiguous 
and confusing. There is no definition of who is a party. The definition of 
what constitutes an adjudicatory proceeding is very broad and vague. It is 
unclear in the section prohibiting parties from communicating with ALJs, 
Section 1705.5(b), exactly what is allowed and when sanctions will be imposed. 
The CPUC has recently determined (3/22/91) that it is time to revisit the 
question of adopting a generic rule governing ex parte contacts in Commission 
proceedings. Comments on the Ex Parte Rule proposed by the Commission are due 
April 22, 1991. The Commission has gained some experience with ex parte rules 
that it has adopted on a case-by-case basis. The Commission is in the best 
position, based on this experience and that of the parties who will comment in 
the Commission's proceeding, to determine the kind of Ex Parte Rule that will 
facilitate its decision-making process while maintaining the due process and 
fair access that are necessary for all parties appearing before it. 
Thank you for considering the concerns about the changes that SB 1041 and 
SB 1042 would make in the CPUC's regulatory processes that I have identified. 
Pacific Bell looks forward to working with the legislature to assure any 
procedural reforms at the CPUC are fair to all parties involved. 
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TESTIMONY OF BAY AREA TELEPORT 
Informational Hearin~: on SB 1041 and SB 1042 
April 9. 1991 
Bay Area Teleport very much appreciates this opportunity to discuss our views on the 
subject of process and procedure at the California Public Utilities Commission. We strongly 
support the fundamental due process concepts addressed by SB 1041 and SB 1042: access 
to justice provided by appellate judicial review, effective controls on ex parte contacts with 
the Commissioners and staff, and more definite rules applicable to the conduct of 
proceedings by the CPUC's Administrative Law Judges. 
Bay Area Teleport· Who We Are 
Bay Area Teleport ("BAT'} is an Alameda-based telecommunications common 
carrier, providing high quality, high speed digital voice and data services via dedicated 
circuits, to long distance interexchange carriers and to business and governmental users. 
Our network serves locations in eleven Northern California counties, including the cities of 
San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Sacramento, Santa Rosa, Santa Cruz, and surrounding 
communities. BAT was founded in 1984 and began offering service in 1986. 
BAT is an entrepreneurial venture, and our network was constructed and operates 
entirely on private capital. Our operations are regulated by both the California Public 
Utilities Commission and the Federal Communications Commission. 
Since our inception, we have been a frequent participant in telecommunications 
matters which come before the CPUC, for two reasons. First, BAT considers its chief 
competitor to be Pacific Bell. Since Pacific Bell is regulated by the CPUC, BAT must 
appear before the CPUC to argue for rules, regulations, and results that control Pacific 
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Bell's ability and incentive to use its monopoly and market power in an anticompetitive 
fashion against BAT. Second, we are a ratepaying customer of Pacific Bell. BAT must 
involve itself at the CPUC to attempt to ensure that we are charged fair rates for the 
monopoly services we must purchase from Pacific Bell. 
The CPUC's Processes and Procedures 
As many public policy makers are aware, the CPUC is in the midst of a significant 
restructuring of its regulatory oversight of telecommunications utilities under its jurisdiction. 
The CPUC has been quite cautious in allowing the benefits of increased competition to be 
realized by California telecommunications consumers, and has proceeded at a slower pace 
than have other major states. Meanwhile, technological change and innovation have 
proceeded rapidly, and have brought competition, although in a de facto manner in some 
cases, for some services in California. 
As competition begins and spreads, the CPUC's regulatory role changes by necessity. 
When the provision of telecommunications services was a 100% monopoly enterprise by 
Pacific Bell, GTE California, and the other Local Exchange Carriers ("LECs") in California, 
the CPUC's primary role was the protection of monopoly ratepayers from monopoly abuses, 
such as overcharges and undue rate discrimination. With the entry of competitors, all of 
whom are both competitors and customers of the LECs, the CPUC must oversee more 
players, must watch for and prevent any anticompetitive activities of the LECs, and must 
also allow the LECs to compete fairly. 
There are, of course, a number of different regulatory models available, based on the 
experiences of numerous other states who have turned the trail the CPUC now walks into 
a well-worn path. The Commission has chosen to modify its telecommunications regulatory 
regime in a number of important aspects, most of which have been implemented in a long-
running docket entitled Investigation 87-11-033. 
In Phase I of this docket, the Commission allowed competition for a handful of 
services previously reserved to Pacific Bell and the other LECs, and granted the LECs 
pricing flexibility for those services. In Phase II, the Commission acceded to the wishes of 
Pacific Bell and GTE California, and substantially changed its regulatory approach for those 
companies in the fall of 1989. The principal outcome of Phase II was the adoption of a new 
pricing structure for LEC telecommunications services, with an emphasis on so-called "price 
caps" and ranges of rates, and a departure from hearing-based rate-setting in the traditional 
rate case context. 
From BATs perspective, the Commission has incorrectly presumed that the 
emergence of some competition for Pacific Bell and the other LECs should be the occasion 
not only for the abandonment of effective regulatory controls over the LECs, in the name 
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of "freeing" the LECs to "compete", but also for the abandonment of the due process rights 
of interested parties before the CPUC. The Commission is departing from traditional 
processes, in which the fundamental decisions involving rates, service, and competition are 
made based on evidence established and tested in the hearing room. As it emphasizes more 
informal methods of policy making, such as "rulemakings", off-the-record ''workshops", and 
advice letters, the Commission has, both practically speaking and as a matter of stated 
policy, de-emphasized the discipline which accompanies the hearing room: the fairness and 
regularity of procedure, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses under oath, and the 
creation of a full and complete evidentiary record. 
Moreover, as it departs from traditional decision making, it appears the Commission 
has adopted a new method of making policy and resolving disputes: prejudgment. Our 
experience, and we believe the experience of most of the companies attempting to make a 
go of it in the telecommunications marketplace in California, has been that no amount of 
facts or evidence presented before an Administrative Law Judge will alter the Commission's 
predetermined course. Traditional hearing processes are not gradually being left behind, 
they are being abandoned so rapidly as to be considered a waste of time by those making 
the Commission's ultimate decisions. Exacerbating this problem is the appearance that such 
predetermined outcomes are arrived at as the direct result of ex parte contacts and 
information provided off-the-record by ratepayer-supported lobbyists of large utility 
companies. 
The I. 87-11-633 Phase HI Experience 
We raise I. 87-11-033 because the Commission's conduct of Phase III of that docket 
provides a telling object lesson on the need for statutory reform of the Public Utilities Code. 
Phase III was established to deal with issues of fundamental importance: the nature, 
pace, and scope of competition for LEC services which the Commission would allow; the 
rules applicable to that competition; the responsive rate changes by LECs which the 
Commission would allow; and the impact of the Commission's decisions on ratepayers at all 
levels. It is difficult to imagine a more important set of decisions for the Commission to 
make in the field of contemporary telecommunications regulation. Moreover, these 
decisions clearly require the development of the best possible record to serve as the basis 
for decision, since many of the necessary decisions are one-time in nature. Unfortunately, 
the Commission attempted ill-advised procedural shortcuts, as the following discussion 
demonstrates. We believe the events of the last year illustrate dramatically the flaws of the 
CPUC's current procedures and the need for intervention by the Legislature. 
In November, 1989, the Assigned Commissioner issued a Ruling that announced a 
new procedural approach for Phase III of I. 87-11-033. "[W]e will use a variety of 
procedural means to build the Phase III record," he stated. "We will rely on 
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notice-and-comment rulemaking to determine policy issues where appropriate. We will hold 
hearings as appropriate on questions of fact where the differ. Workshops may be 
used to resolve questions that follow narrowly or even the 
Commission may adopt..." This Ruling also identified specific to be addressed in what 
was referred to as "Prepared Testimony." 
A number of parties, including Pacific Bell, GTE California and the Commission 
staff, filed opening and reply testimony on the specified issues in January and February, 
1990. Because BATs prior experience in Phases I and IT had shown that the cost of 
retaining an expert witness to prepare such testimony would range from $70,000 to $100,000, 
BAT decided to wait for the promised Phase Ill hearings, where it expected it would be able 
to cross-examine witnesses, submit briefs, and file comments on the Proposed Decision, 
focusing only on the points where its interests were affected or where it could make a direct 
contribution. Like other parties, BAT waited for the scheduling of a pre hearing conference 
to identify hearing dates. No such conference was scheduled, and rumors began to multiply 
that the Commission was going to try to dispense with hearings altogether. (Ironically, the 
Commission had conducted Phase II pursuant to its longstanding practice of evidentiary 
hearings and briefs). BAT became concerned that it would have no opportunity to 
cross-examine witnesses under oath or otherwise intervene in a meaningful 
In July, 1990, the assigned Administrative Law issued a proposed decision. 
BAT strenuously objected to the denial of due process inherent in the attempt to dispense 
with hearings. Pointing to the Assigned Commissioner's Ruling, BAT stated that it had 
relied on the statement that hearings would held on questions of disputed fact; not only 
did BAT show that there were numerous areas with disputed factual claims, but BAT also 
demonstrated that hearings were legally required under Section 1708 of the Public Utilities 
Code because the proposed decision would alter several important prior Commission 
decisions. Despite strong pressures to the contrary from certain other parties, BAT held fast 
to its position that hearings were legally required. TURN joined BAT that effort. 
Ultimately, however, the Commission agreed with BAT and chose not to a Phase III 
decision. 
BAT is proud of the role that it played in confronting, and what many 
parties believed was a fait accompli. namely, the issuance of a Phase III decision without 
the benefit of evidentiary hearings. Looking back on the matter, BAT believes the 
Commission was saved from issuing a decision with numerous factual worse, significant 
policy errors that, belatedly, even Pacific and GTE California recognized would 
brought major adverse consequences for their companies. 
Largely in response to BATs intervention, the proposed 
decision as a new "Proposed Decision" and asked the parties further comment on 
whether hearings were required to resolve disputed facts. After receipt of extensive 
comments from BAT and other parties, the Commission then scheduled the pre hearing 
conference that, under its usual custom and practice, should have a year before. 
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With no small amount of effort, the originally sprawling set of issues was pared down to a 
manageable scope, new testimony was filed, and 16 days of hearings were finally held. 
Those hearings were recently completed, and briefs are due in the near future. Matters that 
the Commission may have believed were capable easy resolution are now seen as 
considerably more complex and stubborn. BAT submits that evidence, not ex parte contacts, 
is what brought that recognition about. 
Why We Support SB 1041 and SB 1042 
BAT is convinced that whatever delay occurred between late 1989 and early 1991 was 
caused almost entirely by the Commission's attempt to dispense with due process and with 
its customary, tried-and-true hearing procedures that permit cross-examination of witnesses 
under oath. Rather than hastening decision, the attempt to avoid hearings caused many 
parties, including BAT, to believe that the Commission, in effect, intended to act on the 
basis of information received outside the hearing room from only those parties with 
sufficient influence to make their voices heard and their wishes known, and without the 
benefit of information from other parties. In other words, what was generated was a distrust 
of the Commission's process; this distrust was finally alleviated only when the Commission 
acknowledged that hearings were not only legally required, but also the best means for 
resolving the complex factual and policy issues awaiting decision. 
Realizing that it was forced to do so regardless of the financial burden, BAT fully 
participated in the Phase III hearings once they were finally held, including actively 
cross-examining other parties' witnesses. Having done so, and having gone to such 
extraordinary lengths to force the Commission to held hearings in Phase III in accordance 
with the promise in the Assigned Commissioner's Ruling, BAT believes more strongly than 
ever that the Phase III decision should now be made only on the basis of substantial 
evidence in the record, not on the basis of ex parte contacts, and that meaningful judicial 
review should be available in case the Commission makes an error of law or abuses its 
discretion in determining matters of fact. 
Typically, ex parte contacts involve representations made at the last minute on 
matters that were never even addressed in the hearing room. Typically they are made by 
persons who have no knowledge of, or interest in, what happened in the hearing room. 
Typically the information is inaccurate or, if not inaccurate, subtly biased in favor of the 
fortunate party that has gained the decisionmaker's attention. Not only are other parties 
prevented from rebutting (or even learning about) such information, but worse, the 
Commission may reach a decision on the basis of factors antithetical to the welfare of the 
state as a whole. 
Moreover, limits on ex parte contacts go hand-in-hand with meaningful judicial 
reVIew. Meaningful judicial review helps insure that a Commission decision will be reached 
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on the basis of substantial evidence in the record. Having a court with time to review the 
record increases the chances that a decision will be made in the first instance on the basis 
of a fair and impartial assessment of all. the evidence in the record, not simply the evidence 
argued in ex parte contacts. BATs experience in I. 87-11-033 and, in particular, in Phase 
ill thereof, convinces BAT that these are necessary regulatory reforms, and that they should 
be made part of the Public Utilities Code so that other parties will not be forced in the 
future, as BAT was, to undertake such extensive efforts simply to insure that a hearing is 
held. 
A long list of parties will, by the time this legislative hearing is concluded, bring to 
the Committee's attention the current realities of the CPUC judicial appeal process: for all 
intents and purposes, this process is almost nonexistent. The first line of appeal -- to the 
Commission itself for a reversal of a previous decision -- is seldom effective. The next, and 
~other line of appeal is to the California Supreme Court, via a writ of review process. 
The Committee is no doubt well aware that California is the only major state which does 
not provide for judicial review as a matter of right of its utilities commission's decisions. 
This, combined with the crush of death penalty and criminal appeals before the Supreme 
Court, has created an appeal "gridlock" which denies any meaningful review to disaffected 
or injured parties as the result of CPUC decisions. 
Thus, the environment within the Commission, wherein procedures and rules are 
essentially being written as the agency goes along (and often to support predetermined 
outcomes), is not merely allowed to exist because of an absence of any real oversight-- it 
is encouraged. The CPUC is free to act as it chooses with the full knowledge that aggrieved 
parties have no judicial body available to them to ask for a review of factual or evidentiary 
integrity of Commission decisions, and no meaningful review of conformity to statutory or 
Constitutional law as a deterrent against future unfair action. 
For the past five years, BAT has joined with other competitive companies, the 
California Manufacturers Association, the California Judicial Council, and a diverse 
grouping of interests in seeking to introduce a measure of meaningful judicial review into 
the decision making of the CPUC. We supported AB 4237 (Hauser) in 1987, and AB 338 
(Floyd) in 1989. Since 1989, we have sought to build support for the introduction of a new 
appellate review bill by contacting dozens of companies, associations, and agencies who 
believe, as we do, that the CPUC was becoming increasingly unaccountable for increasingly 
questionable decision making. They believe, as we do, that CPUC decisions are simply too 
important and costly to be made without appropriate judicial review when necessary. 
Our concerns also led us to support Senator Rosenthal's attempt last year to 
introduce a fair reporting mechanism for off-the-record contacts at the CPUC, SB 1125. 
BAT believes that access to decision-makers at all levels of the Commission can be a useful 
way of communicating general information. However, we feel it is equally important that 
a record of such exchanges be kept. In this way, all concerned parties can know at least 
which decision makers have been contacted and when. 
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We also strongly support the provision of SB 1042 which requires the CPUC to make 
its decisions based on the record of proceedings of a particular case. We attempted to 
amend AB 338 with a similar provision two years ago. 
Conclusion 
Bay Area Teleport has rarely believed it appropriate for the Legislature to involve 
itself in determining specific outcomes of CPUC decision making. We do believe that 
individuals can make mistakes and that the process for arriving at certain outcomes can be 
flawed. Ultimately, this is why we believe there is a compelling need for SB 1041 and SB 
1042. We know of no reason why the CPUC should be alone among state agencies (and 
indeed alone among major states' public utilities commissions) in avoiding judicial review. 
Likewise, we believe it is time the Legislature took a hard look at the role of off-the-record 
discussions in Commission decisions. The Commission, unlike the Legislature, does not face 
the threat of electoral scrutiny. It should be compelled to base its decisions on record facts 
and evidence. 
We respectfully urge passage of SB 1041 and SB 1042, and stand ready to assist the 
Members and their staffs as they consider any modifications which may be appropriate to 
these long-overdue pieces of legislation. 
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GOLD, MARKs, RING & PEPPER 
1800 AVENUE OF THE STARS 
SUITE 300 
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067 
TELEPHONE (2131 277-1000 
FACSIMILE (2131 553-4647 
April 8, 1991 
Senator David Roberti 
President Pro Tempore 
State of California Senate 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Senator Roberti: 
Direct Une 
(113) l84-7l9S 
Thank you for your letter of March 26, 1991 regarding Senate 
Bills 1041 and 1042. 
This office represents the Western Burglar & Fire Alarm 
Association which is a trade association of security companies 
doing business in the State of California. They are large users 
of telecommunications services and have been interested parties 
in telephone company proceedings dating back to the 1960's. The 
Western Burglar & Fire Alarm Association supports both of your 
proposed bills. 
The limitation of judicial review of Public Utility 
Commission decisions to the California supreme Court has created 
a de facto immunity for the Commission from judicial review. 
Over its history, the Supreme Court has reviewed very few Public 
Utility Commission cases and it is quite appropriate to amend the 
review process to permit easier access to a judicial forum. This 
is particularly relevant in light of the fact that in recent 
proceedings the Commission has attempted to or in fact has 
dispensed with evidentiary hearings before making decisions on 
key issues. This occurred in the alternative regulatory 
framework proceedings (1.87-11-033) and the Commission's review 
into the cellular radiotelephone utilities (!.88-11-040). 
The WBFAA also supports Senate Bill 1042. The interested 
parties do not enjoy the same access to the Commissioners and 
their staff as are enjoyed by the utilities. Therefore, 
unrestricted ex parte contacts have generally worked to the 
disservice and disfavor of interested parties and consumers in 
general. However, there is a modification that should be made to 
SB 1042 with regard to notice. 
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It would be appropriate to amend Sections 1705.5(a) (2) and 
1705.5(b) to provide that a copy of the notice and description of 
the communication be served on all parties of record rather than 
merely being placed in the public file. If it is only placed in 
the public file, it is unlikely that the interested parties will 
become aware of the communication in a timely manner. 
We appreciate your concern regarding these important issues, 
and if we may be of further service or assistance, please do not 
hesitate to contact us. 
Yours truly, 
GOLD, MARKS, RING & PEPPER 
By------::-::~---=---=l~, _Q ~_,.__,._--=--
Alan L. Pepper 
ALP:clr 
cc: Roger Westphal, President, 
Western Burglar & Fire Alarm Assn. 
Senator Bill Lockyer, Chairman, 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
/senator Herschel Rosenthal, Chairman, 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
52970\054\ALP04081.let 
Mc1 
MCI Telecommunications 
Corporation 
20 1 Spear Street 
N1nth Floor 
San Franc1sco. CA 94105 
-115 978 1208 
April 8, 1991 
Ann Gressan1 
Government Relat1ons 
Pac:f1c OIVI«Ion 
Senator David Roberti 
Senate President ProTem 
State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Re: SB 1041 -- SUPPORT 
Hearing April 9th, Joint Meeting of Senate Committees on 
Judiciary and Energy & Public Utilities 
Dear Senator Roberti: 
MCI strongly supports SB 1041, which will provide parties in 
proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) the right to 
appeal PUC decisions to the Court of Appeal. This measure would 
provide a realistic opportunity for relief under a regulatory system 
increasingly characterized by a lack of due process resulting from the 
informal and ad hoc decision making employed by the PUC as it attempts 
to move away from traditional regulation. In addition to being afforded 
the opportunity to appeal unjust decisions, MCI believes that the increased 
possibility of judicial review proposed by this bill would serve to encourage 
the PUC to more scrupulously enforce due process procedures as part of 
its decision making, and lead to a more fair and equitable regulatory 
process. 
Decisions of the PUC have imposed upon MCI new and 
unreasonable requirements which were never the subject of evidentiary 
proceedings, or subject to challenge through cross-examination or other 
processes. Furthermore, our efforts to demand due process have been 
circumvented by the Commission's apparent ability to ignore altogether 
legitimate protests. In order to strengthen SB 1041, the bill should be 
amended to address a new informal method of decision-making at the PUC 
which leaves MCI and other parties with regulatory "decisions" that are 
never even put into writing, which render us unable even to use the 
appellate process intended to be provided by your bill. 
Senator Roberti 
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For example, a utility may request an expedited rate change through 
the device of an "advice letter" filing to the PUC. This procedure delegates 
almost all decision-making responsibility to PUC staff, rather than to 
appointed officials. Although time is allowed for parties with concerns to 
file protests against the proposed change, the PUC staff may choose to 
ignore the protests completely and allow the rate change automatically to 
go into effect without even issuing an ord~r that addresses and adequately 
responds to the concerns of the protesting parties. The protesting party 
has no way of knowing whether the Commissioners themselves were even 
aware that a protest had been filed. Furthermore, the rate change goes 
into effect without the creation of an appealable PUC decision establishing 
the legal or factual basis for ignoring the legal challenges contained in the 
protests. 
Therefore, we suggest including the following amendment which 
would simply require the PUC to either grant or deny properly-filed 
protests and complaints, by issuing an order that adequately responds to 
any legitimate issues that have been raised. Such an amendment would 
assure that the Commissioners are aware of the protest and provide 
interested parties with a full explanation of the basis for the PUC's 
decision. If concerns still remain, this written decision will enable parties 
to seek judicial review of the Commission's action, and enable the Court to 
comprehend the nature of the dispute and rationale by which the 
commission reached its decision, thereby facilitating the appellate review 
process. 
Proposed Amendment 
Add third paragraph to existing Public Utilities Code Section 728: 
If a customer or competitor of a utility or other interested 
person files a timely-filed protest or complaint, alleging that the 
rates or classifications that any utility demands, deserves, charges or 
collects, or proposes to demand, deserve, charge or collect, for or in 
connection with any service, product or commodity, or that the 
existing or proposed rules, practices or contracts affecting such rates 
or classifications are insufficient, unlawful, unjust, unreasonable, 
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall, in a timely 
manner, issue an order that either grants, in whole or in part, the 
protest or complaint, or denies, in whole or in part, the protest or 
Senator Roberti 
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complaint, and which sets forth the reasons for the Commission's 
decision, including the factual and legal bases upon which it 
disposed of the protest or complaint. 
MCI greatly appreciates your interest in addressing the important 
issues of PUC regulation, issues with a profound economic impact on 
consumers and businesses in California. We are eager to work closely with 
you and your staff to help this important proposal become law. 
Sincerely, 
~~~W'· 
Ann Gressani 
Manager, Government Relations 
cc: Senator Herschel Rosenthal 
Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
Senator Bill Lockyer 
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee 
JOINT INFORMATIONAL HEARING 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITfEE 
AND 
April 9, 1991 
SENATE ENERGY AND PUBUC UTIUTIES COMMITfEE 
REFORM OF PUBUC UTIUTIES COMMISSION PROCEDURES 
SB 1041 AND SB 1042, ROBERTI 
My name is Daniel Baker, and I am counsel for the Ad Hoc Carriers 
Committee which is an association of small and medium size PUC regulated 
motor carriers. Its primary function is to participate in PUC general freight 
investigations proceedings, to assist in the development of an adequate 
record upon which the Commission can base a rational and proper decision. 
In the past two general freight investigation proceedings, the Ad Hoc 
Carriers provided more expert witnesses than any other participant. The 
basic regulatory program adopted by the Commission in its 1986 Decision 
was proposed by the Ad Hoc Carriers. 
I have practiced before the Commission and the California Supreme 
1 
Court for over 30 years. I have testified before the Judiciary Committee of 
the Senate on behalf of the State Bar on the same issue, an appeal from 
PUC decisions, about 20 years ago. The argument was the same - there is 
no actual appeal to the state Supreme Court from capricious, arbitrary, and 
even unlawful Commission decisions. The PUC under the present system is 
accountable to no one. 
The recent Commission general freight decision issued February 1990, 
is a clear example of what is wrong with this appeal system. The most 
important element of the rate regulatory program adopted by that decision, 
a variable cost price floor or a minimum rate floor, was not introduced in 
the case until eight months after the proceeding record was closed. An 
obvious violation of due process. PUC Code 1705 requires findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to be based upon the case record for all material 
issues. There could be no findings or conclusions based upon the case 
record for the variable cost price floor for the matter was not introduced, 
argued, or considered in the proceeding. Section 491 of the Code requires 
that all common carrier rates and tariffs to be filed on 30 days notice to the 
Commission and the public. The Commission by its decision reduced the 
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statutory notice to 10 days. Section 3662 states that the PUC "shall" 
establish or approve rates for permitted carriers. By its decision, the PUC 
changed the word "shall'' to "shall not" establish or approve rates for these 
earners. There are additional findings and conclusions in the decision 
equally repugnant to fairness and the law of this state, but I believe the few 
mentioned clearly demonstrate the problem that exists. 
Three petitions for writs of review were filed with the state Supreme 
Court asking for an appeal of the February, 1990 decision, all of which were 
denied. The Ad Hoc Carriers petition received the most votes to grant an 
appeal, however, it obtained only three of the four votes that were required 
and "close is only good in horse races." 
Another deficiency in the present system is that "reconsideration" by 
the Supreme Court of a denial of a petition for a writ of review is not 
permitted. However, such a right is available from all other state and 
federal courts including the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The California system with regard to appeals from PUC decisions is 
defective, unfair, and practically nonexistent. A change in these appellate 
procedures is long overdue. 
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With respect to SB 1402, the 1990 California PUC in the recent past 
regulated through ex parte communications and by a marketplace 
philosophy. The investigation which resulted in the 1990 general freight 
regulatory program involved 58 days of oral hearings but the decision is 
almost bare of any discussion of the factual evidence introduced. Generally, 
it was a waste of time and effort by the over 100 witnesses and literally 
thousands of participants which appeared in the case directly or through 
their associations. Ex parte communication is not for the little people which 
are disadvantaged from this unfair and improper practice. And the 
marketplace philosophy and policies are not designed to protect the vast 
majority of the people of this state which the PUC was created to protect. 
Ask the question why these ex parte communications cannot be offered 
1n the formal oral hearings which are held for the specific purpose of 
gathering pertinent information. At these hearings the information to be 
offered is submitted under oath and its creditability and reliability is tested 
through cross-examination. The Commissioners of the PUC are not 
competent to test or challenge the ex parte statements. None of the 
Commissioners have been employed by or associated with utilities they 
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control nor a shipper or a earner. Hearings are conducted to protect 
Commissioners against prejudiced, distorted, incredible, and/or untrue 
statements. Receiving and encouraging ex parte back-door communications 
bypasses the safeguards established for the Commissioners and for the 
protection of the people of this state. 
The ex parte communication should not be tolerated and should be 
declared unlawful. The decisionmakers of our courts are forbidden by law 
from receiving ex parte communications. PUC's Commissioners' decisions on 
important issues are of far greater significance and consequence than an 
order of any judge and ex parte communication should be subjected to the 
same restraints. 
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Facsimile (415) 325-9041 
Voice ~1aU (415) 748-6274 
Please be so kind as to add this letter to the hearing record in support of enactment of 
Senate Bill 1041 and Senate Billl042. I understand that these bills will be the _subject of a joint 
informational hearing on April 9 before the Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee. I urge the Committees to approve these bills for consideration 
by the full Senate .. 
SB 1041 would accomplish two important reforms in judicial review of decisions made 
by the California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC" or "Commission"). First, it provides 
for direct review of Commission decisions by the Court of Appeal rather than the California 
Supreme Court. Second, it would authorize the Court of Appeal to review whether Commission 
decisions are supported by substantial evidence in the Commission's record (and not simply 
whether the Commission has regularly pursued its authority). These refonns are long overdue. 
This bill would result in meaningful judicial review of CPUC decisions for the first time in a 
long time. The current workload of the California Supreme Court effectively precludes judicial 
review. The Supreme Court's workload is so heavily burdened with death penalty cases and 
other criminal matters that the Court appears to be strongly disinclined to grant review of 
CPUC decisions. as evidenced by the relative handful of CPUC decisions actually accepted for 
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review by the Court in the last seven years. Indeed, except when a decision involves a matter 
of general law outside the CPUC's specific jurisdiction, the Court almost never reviews the 
Commission's decisions. This situation has left the Commission virtually a law onto itself, with 
little real oversight. Such a situation should not be allowed to continue. I do not believe that 
there is any regulatory commission in the United States that enjoys as much unreviewable 
discretion as the CPUC; given the enormous influence that the CPUC has on both the state and 
national economies, it is vital that it be subjected to meaningful judicial review. 
SB 1042 would effect an equally important reform in the Commission's procedures. 
Principally, it would enact a ban on ex ~ contacts with CPUC Commissioners in any 
uadjudicatory proceeding" pending before the CPUC concerning any issue of law or fact 
involved in the proceeding. This refonn also is long overdue. Unfortunately, to an extent that 
the public and perhaps even the Legislature scarcely imagines, much of the CPUC's current 
business is heavily influenced by~ n..arte contact. I regret having felt obliged, on behalf of my 
clients, to engage in such contact, and I would like to see the whole system ended. The result 
of such contacts is not only a loss of confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the 
Commission's decision-making processes, but also, in the long run, a loss of quality in the 
CPUC's decisions as well. Typically,~ parte presentations involve information that was not 
tested in the hearing room; such information is either wholly in~urate or biased or both, and 
should never be the basis for decision. Yet, when other parties are unable to rebut (and, worse, 
often do not even know about) such presentations, g parte information frequently does become 
part of the ground for decision. Again, this situation should not be allowed to continue. 
I believe I am well positioned to offer these observations. First, I served as a research 
attorney for the California Supreme Court in 1978 and 1979, so that I have more than a passing 
acquaintance with some of the pressures on that Court's caseload. Second, after leaving the 
Court, I joined the Commission's Legal Division and then served as the Legal Advisor to (the 
late) Commissioner (later Judge) Richard D. Gravelle between 1980 and 1982. In that position, 
I frequently attended meetings involving ~ parte presentations; thus, I have had the opportunity 
to know and understand quite intimately the advantages and disadvantages of such contacts. 
Finally, since 1983, I have frequently appeared before the Commission as an attorney in private 
practice on behalf of numerous clients. As stated above, at times I have felt obliged to make 
~parte presentations myself, and I have always personally regretted their necessity. Suffice 
it to say, I am quite familiar with both the Commission's processes and its decisions over a time 
period extending more than 10 years. After long thought on the subject, I have come to the 
point where I strongly support the reforms proposed in SB 1041 and 1042. I urge the Legisla~ 
ture to. pass these bills. 
I believe that SB 1041 and SB 1042 represent an historic opportunity for the legislature 
to ensure that the Commission remains faithful to the purposes for which it was established 
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almost 80 years ago, namely, to protect all Californians from. the power and influence of large 
economic interests providing monopoly services essential to their welfare. If these reforms are 
not adopted, the Commission will likely conclude that the future should involve less, rather than 
more, due process and lesst rather than more, opportunity for the voices of ordinary Califor-
nians to be heard. Please let me know if there is anything that I can do to assist in seeing these 
bills enacted. 
Very truly yours, 
, .• 1 -~ .. r··· ?ut-)f~~ -~~ 
Earl Nicholas Selby 
ENS/lmj 
